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ABSTRACT
Small local governmental units are responsible for 
allocating resources on behalf of a substantial portion of 
all United States citizens. The research reported here 
investigates the effects of presentation format (or framing) 
on decision preference in a governmental resource allocation 
context. The subjects represent a population of 
governmental units which has not received prior research 
attention— small local governments. Budget preparers were 
asked to choose among objectively identical alternatives, 
which differed in presentation formats. The cases used to 
investigate the effects of presentation were modelled after 
Kahneman and Tversky's [1979] seminal work in prospect 
theory, which addressed violations of expected utility 
theory.
The survey's approximately 50% response rate provided 
results indicating that the subjects of this study cannot be 
considered "rational decision makers" as defined by the well 
accepted expected utility theory. However, most of their 
decision behavior could be explained with the concepts of 
prospect theory. The implications of this research include 
the need for further investigation of the resource 
allocation process of small local governments. Readers 
should note that this study and its findings are based on 
responses to structured cases, which may not be
vii
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representative of the subject's actual decision making 
environment. Further research is necessary to determine 
whether similar results can be associated with subjects 
operating within their natural budgetary decision making 
environment in the absence of such structured cases. The 
fact that approximately 25% of the United States population 
is served by these small governments suggests the need for 
continued research.
Vlll
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
The objective of the proposed research study is to 
contribute to the governmental budgeting and behavioral 
research knowledge base in two principal ways. First, the 
study will focus on the decisions of local governmental unit 
budgeting management (or officials). A review of relevant 
literature suggests that empirical evidence is sparse in 
regard to behavioral aspects of the budgeting process, 
including resource allocation, at the level of the local 
governmental unit. Second, prospect theory, which has 
received considerable attention in recent psychology and 
business literature, is used to determine whether a more 
complete understanding of the budgetary decision making 
process under uncertainty may be obtained, as compared to 
the more widely applied expected utility explanation of the 
process.
The concepts of prospect theory are summarized in the 
proposal and employed in the research design. Subjects' 
decision responses will be examined for empirical evidence 
of violations regarding the fundamental elements of rational 
choice behavior, consistence and coherence. Results of the 
study may indicate a need for improvement of the existing 
approach to budgeting decisions at the local level (e.g., 
incorporation of deliberate decision frames into typical 
resource allocation decisions). The next section of this
1
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2chapter provides a brief review of the governmental 
budgeting and prospect theory literatures, and is followed 
by a presentation of the proposed research methodology. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the contributions and 
relevance of the study.
Background
THE BUDGETING ENVIRONMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Resource allocation is a major concern to all members 
of any organization. This is true whether the organization 
is as global in perspective as the entire human race, or as 
focused in perspective as small task groups with a single, 
well-defined objective. Kee, Robbins, and Apostolou [1987, 
p. 16] identify the allocation of scarce resources among 
alternatives as "one of the most important tasks municipal 
administrators must undertake." The allocation process is 
rarely a strictly quantitative one. For almost every 
decision made regarding resource allocation, numerous 
qualitative issues must be addressed. This is especially 
true in the public sector, where political and social 
considerations often take precedence over financial 
analysis. Thus, behavioral research has an important role 
in society. Such research has worked toward an 
understanding of the decision making processes in managerial 
roles under conditions of both certainty and uncertainty.
As our understanding grows with regard to decision making
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3behavior, we should be more capable of improving processes 
which involve uncertainty, such as resource allocation.
Many authors have expressed the view that this is a 
time when local governmental units are being forced to make 
more efficient and effective resource allocations than ever 
before.1 According to Naisbett [1984, p. 103], "State and 
local governments are the most important political entities 
in America." Americans have become more politically aware 
on a local level. While voter turnout is embarrassingly low 
for national elections, Naisbett notes a sharp contrast for 
local issues. He cites turnouts for initiatives and 
referenda increasing to over 75% in some areas of the United 
States. Blubaugh [1987, p. 8] notes, "More and more voters 
themselves are demanding to be a part of the governmental 
decision process." Demands are growing for greater bottom- 
up participation in policy-making as people affected by 
local government decisions are becoming more a part of the 
decision making process. Furthermore, Luke [1986, p. 134] 
believes the increasing numbers of neighborhood groups are 
becoming more sophisticated and more politically powerful. 
They are demanding more and monitoring government actions 
more closely. All of this is happening at a time when the 
federal government has placed greater resource allocation 
burdens on local governments by restructuring grant programs
^Recent examples include Naisbett (1984); Kee, Robbins, 
and Apostolou (1987); Luke (1986); Cothran (1986); and Sharp 
(1986).
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4and reducing funding.  ^ interestingly, Luke [1986, p. 135] 
finds that local governments are now the principal providers 
of most domestic services nation-wide, which puts the scarce 
resource allocation decision primarily in the hands of local 
governments.
Major changes in the U.S. economy, such as the 
continuous technological innovation, have affected the local 
governments' budgeting environment. Margolis [1987] states 
that political pressures have increased as a result of 
changing technology, which has not only increased the amount 
of leisure time citizens have available for monitoring 
public officials but has also improved transportation and 
communication to aid in such monitoring efforts. In 
addition, the tremendous changes in computer technology and 
availability have changed the budgeting environment faced by 
local officials.
As a result of changing technology and data producing 
capabilities, local administrators of the near future must 
be capable of selecting and focusing attention on the few 
salient issues present within the sea of information 
available to the officials. Officials (or managers) must be 
able to think strategically, which includes determining what
^Reagan's "New Federalism" has been aimed at shifting 
decision making from the federal to state & local levels of 
government. Also, Luke [1986] notes that the funding 
reversals have changed state and local relationships as 
perceived by local government managers and have led to the 
constituency's negative perceptions as well as lower 
employee morale.
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5kind of information is needed to assist in a particular 
policy choice or program decision [Luke, 1986, p. 136].
These technological changes suggest that local governing 
officials must be increasingly careful in their selection of 
information for analysis, as well as in the actions chosen 
to serve their constituency, which has grown significantly 
in strength. For the many locally elected officials who are 
seeking to make careers of holding public office, current 
daily decisions must be made with both the community and 
their own career interests in mind.3 As a result of the 
increased pressure and perhaps intimidation that 
constituencies are placing on elected officials, Blubaugh 
[1987, p. 9] has noted that considerable turmoil exists ". . 
. in the delivery of local government services, more so than 
ever before." Interestingly, over a decade ago, Hobbs 
[1971, p. 49] noted the expected population increase for 
many rural communities long accustomed to decline and 
suggested the need for "effective planning organizations 
capable of estimating participatory ways of meeting service 
needs."
The developments identified above have a significant 
impact on the state of local government, and an awareness of
^Blubaugh [1987] discusses this in his article 
addressing the public administrator's changing role. Also, 
Luke [1986, p. 135] refers to the Freedom of Information Act 
as another source for concern among local officials due to 
the easier access to data which was previously unavailable 
to their constituency.
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6such issues may be used to effectively shape local 
governments into organizations capable of meeting the varied 
needs of their constituencies. As Luke [1987, p. 132] 
states, "(these issues) are challenges that create problems 
worth solving as well as opportunities worth anticipating." 
The change in the local government environment suggests that 
the decision making capability of budget personnel and the 
effects of the decision making environment on those 
personnel warrant consideration. Yet, a review of the 
literature suggests that empirical evidence is sparse to 
nonexistent in regard to behavioral aspects of the budgeting 
process of local governments.
SMALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS & ASPECTS OF THE BUDGETING PROCESS 
Cothran [1986] defines small government as 
jurisdictions serving populations of less'than 10,000. 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Census Statistical Abstract 
[1986, p. 286], governments serving less than 10,000 people 
compose 94% of all townships, 88% of all municipalities, 24% 
of all counties, and serve approximately 25% of the entire 
U.S. population. Together with the increasing activism of 
citizens in local governmental affairs (as discussed in the 
previous section), these percentages emphasize the 
importance of small governments and their potential impact 
on society. Yet, local government research has not 
adequately addressed the issues of small governments.
Cornia and Usher [1981, p. 75] point out that most
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
governmental budgeting research is focused on state and 
federal levels and generalized (perhaps unjustifiably) to 
municipal budgeting. They found very little empirical 
research addressing local budgeting, even though local 
expenditures were approaching 10% of GNP at the time of 
their research. Stallings and Ferris [1988, p. 583] 
reviewed public administration research for the 45 year 
period of 1940 through 1984 and found that local government 
has never been a major focus for governmental research.4 
Hy, Waugh, and Nelson [1987, p. 136] may provide an 
explanation for such a lack of empirical research. They 
state:
While administrators have become aware of the need for 
an operating theory or framework for postulating 
relationships between and among variables or factors 
and for constructing testable hypotheses, the tools for 
doing so have not been adequately assimilated. One of 
the reasons may be that public administration education 
has not provided the necessary analytical skills and 
perspectives to frame major or administrative questions 
in testable and generalizable forms.
The Council of Developmental Choices maintains that to meet
the changing needs of the 1980s, all who participate in the
development process must be willing to change the status quo
[Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1981, p. xii].
^Local government research was found to increase 
slightly in the early 1960s, but has remained constant as a 
very small portion of published articles. The authors 
reviewed work in Public Administration Review due to their 
regard for the journal as the official professional 
publication within the field and their belief that it would 
be most representative of research of general interest to 
the profession.
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8Until the survey conducted by Kee et al. [1987], no 
attempt had been made to assess the state of municipal 
governments' budgeting practices. The survey focused 
primarily on the area of capital budgeting, which Cothran 
[1986, p. 32] identifies as one of the more difficult 
aspects of budgeting and one of the twelve elements of 
financial management and planning listed by the 
International City Management Association (ICMA). Kee et 
al. [1987, p. 22] found that political and social 
considerations, which may be directly linked to risk, can 
have significant influence over asset selection in the 
public sector. Of the 200 municipal finance officers 
surveyed, 79% of the respondents indicated that the degree 
of investment risk is a primary consideration in the 
selection of capital projects. Furthermore, 39% of the 
respondents rely on nonquantitative procedures in the 
analysis of risk. Consequently, the authors found highly 
subjective and unsophisticated methods of risk analysis and 
capital project selection to be employed more frequently 
than such sophisticated approaches as net present value 
(NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR).^ It seems 
reasonable to presume that smaller local governments than
^Kee, et al. [1987] randomly selected and surveyed 200 
municipal finance officers of cities having populations of 
at least 50,000. The authors achieved a 49% response rate. 
These cities were found to have reasonably well-educated and 
experienced officers and perhaps more structured budgeting 
approaches than might be found in smaller governments.
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9those surveyed by Kee et al. are employing methods of even 
less sophistication and objectivity. As Cothran [1986, p.
31] notes;
Small governments often lack strong chief executives 
such as city or county managers to prepare and review 
the budget. Therefore, several officials in small 
communities divide the tasks usually performed by a 
strong chief executive in larger systems, although one 
official— usually the elected clerk— coordinates the 
process and compiles departmental requests for 
presentation to the local legislature.
Using the standards of larger and more sophisticated
governments, Sokolow and Hondale [1984, p. 377] failed to
identify a single administrator of rural jurisdictions as a
"professional" budget officer. This may be considered a
major problem in local government. Small governments are
the primary provider of domestic services and are under the
increasing scrutiny of their citizenry regarding the
allocation of scarce resources to those services. Yet,
small governments are most susceptible to constraints
imposed by limited resources (both monetary and human),
which aid in the accomplishment of such an arduous task.
One of the major problems emphasized above is that very
little empirical research has been directed at the local
government level. Most state and federal level research has
simply been projected onto local governments. This practice
is seemingly unjustified. Similarly, the little research
which does exist regarding local government activity,
perhaps unjustifiably, has been generalized to smaller local
governments, which are probably profoundly less
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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sophisticated than the larger local governments studied to 
date. 6
EFFECTS OF FRAMING ON DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Local government resource allocation decisions are 
becoming increasingly difficult in light of decreased 
federal support and increased public activism. Such 
decisions may be classified as decisions involving 
uncertainty, given the political and social ramifications 
everpresent in the public sector and the diversity of 
interest groups demanding satisfaction of their specific 
needs. However, Gibbins [1984, p. 103] states that there is 
insufficient knowledge of what happens when experienced 
people employ judgment in decision making situations of 
significance, "amid the pressures, constraints, dangers, and 
opportunities of their everyday environment." Thus, 
attention to the decision making process in an environment 
of uncertainty appears warranted.
Until the late 1970s, most literature focusing or 
building on the concept of rational choice in situations of 
uncertainty relied on the expected utility hypothesis of 
behavior?, which assumes decision-makers, given new 
information, consistently use a Bayesian learning model and
®See chapter 2 for a discussion of differences between 
state and local levels of government as well as between 
smaller and larger local governments.
^Influential, early work includes Mosteller and Nogee 
[1951] and Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel [1957].
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conditional probability information to update their beliefs.
As Arrow [1982, p. 1] notes:
In good measure, the expected-utility hypothesis 
provided an important starting point for these studies 
(regarding the capacity of human beings for perception 
and judgment), in the sense that it provided a 
refutable hypothesis and indeed one for which the 
testing of implications was rather straightforward.
One significant research effort testing the
implications of expected-utility theory was Lichtenstein and
Slovic's [1971] work with choices between pairs of gambles,
resulting in the "preference-reversal" phenomenon.
Lichtenstein and Slovic found that subjects often equate a
lower guaranteed dollar amount with the subjects' preferred
gamble, which contradicts the postulates of rationality (see
Figure 1.1). Similarly, Arrow [1982] notes several research
efforts which have shown that a fundamental element of
rationality, extensionality®, may not be applicable to
choice.
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] emphasize the importance 
of descriptions in their development of prospect theory.
They have found that significant differences exist between 
choices made when objectively identical situations are 
framed (or described) in terms of gains rather than in terms 
of losses. This is referred to as the "context effect"
®Extensionality suggests that choice depends on the set 
of alternatives from which the choice can be made. A change 
in description of objectively identical alternatives should 
not change the decision or choice.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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FIGURE 1.1
An Illustration of Preference Reversal Effects*
Subjects are told that they have the opportunity to throw a 
single dart. They may throw the dart at either target A or 
target B. The payoffs are as follows:
Target A: $4 - dart hits anywhere within target A,
except on the radius line.
$0 - dart hits the radius line of target A.
Target B: $16 - dart hits within shaded portion of
target B.
$0 - dart hits outside the shaded portion.
Target A Target B
0
Subjects must choose between A or B. Once they have 
indicated their preference, they are asked to calculate the 
expected value for each target. Subjects who first choose A 
do tend to then calculate a higher expected value for B.
Example was taken from Professor Charles Plott's 
presentation during the 1988 AAA Doctoral Student 
Consortium.
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or "framing". For example, Tversky and Kahneman [1981]
asked subjects to respond to the following objectively
identical situations:
The U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs are being considered. Which 
would you favor? (158 subjects were given a choice 
between Programs A & B, and 169 subjects were given a 
choice between Programs C & D).
1. If Program A is adopted, 200 will be saved.
2. If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third
probability that all will be saved and a two-thirds 
probability that none will be saved.
3. If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
4. If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third
probability that no one will die and a two-thirds
probability that 600 people will die.
Seventy-six percent of the first group of respondents chose
Program A. While the expected utilities of both programs (A
& B) were equal, respondents valued the sure 200 lives saved
more than the risky prospect of equal expected value.
However, only 13% of the respondents chose Program C (given
the choice of C or D), which is equal to the preferred
Program A— saving 200 lives and losing 400.
When given a choice between a sure loss of 400 lives
and a two-thirds chance at losing all 600 lives, respondents
tended to be risk-seeking and hoped for the long shot of not
losing any lives. It was a result of noting such
inconsistencies of expected utility theory, which predicts
no change in response when objectively identical situations
are described differently, that led Tversky and Kahneman to
the development of prospect theory, which presents
explanations for inconsistent responses in terms of risk-
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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averse and risk-seeking tendencies of individuals perceiving 
situations from different perspectives (or reference 
points). Prospect theory predicts risk-averse behavior when 
individuals are confronted with an evaluation of gains and 
risk-seeking behavior when individuals are confronted with 
an evaluation of losses.
This approach seems particularly appropriate for the 
analysis of the decision making process of local officials. 
As Luke [1986, p. 134] notes in his discussion of the role 
of the local administrator of the 1990s, "Managing strategic 
information is essentially a problem-setting process, where 
problems are identified and assessed, rather than a problem­
solving process."
Bazerman et al. [1985, p. 310] extend a call for 
research to investigate " . . .  how negotiators can frame the 
behaviors of their opponents." Given the environment of 
local government decision making, prospect theory appears to 
be a viable approach to investigating any violations of 
rationality made by individuals responsible for the 
allocation of scarce resources. If violations are present, 
the concepts of prospect theory may prove useful in 
educating governmental decision makers. As Kahneman and 
Tversky [1979, p. 277] claim:
Such anomalies (departures from expected utility 
theory) of preference are normally corrected by the 
decision maker when he realizes that his preferences 
are inconsistent, intransitive, or inadmissible. In 
many situations, however, the decision maker does not
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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have the opportunity to discover that his preferences
could violate decision rules that he wishes to obey.
The reality of scarce resources and the competition for 
those resources among interested parties has contributed to 
an increasing activism among constituencies, all of whom 
must present their needs to the government for consideration 
in the allocation process. While the constituency must 
present a request for allocation, it does hold the power to 
vote for the decision makers currently in office. Thus, 
governmental decision makers must be careful to evaluate all 
needs of its constituency and justify all allocation 
decisions, which necessarily involves the denial of requests 
of some other constituencies.
The act of framing may exist in the constituency's 
presentation to the governmental unit— emphasizing the need 
for resource allocation in particular directions. Thus, 
governmental decision makers should be made aware of the 
implications of framing on the quality of their decisions. 
Furthermore, once resource allocation decisions have been 
carefully made by the governmental unit, the unit should be 
aware of the usefulness of framing in the presentation of 
its decisions to the constituency. Many times there is no 
right answer to problems faced by governmental decision 
makers, yet decisions must be made. There will always be 
some part of the constituency which opposes the chosen 
action. Awareness of the views of such individuals may help
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decision makers present the same objective information to 
such people in the most palatable frame.
Research Objectives
RESEARCH QUESTION
Several of the works cited above have extended calls 
for additional research. These calls emphasize significant 
gaps in the current governmental budgeting literature. This 
study responds to the call for additional research by 
focusing on a managerial accounting issue within a small, 
local governmental entity. Kahneman and Tversky's [1979] 
concept of prospect theory (as discussed in the following 
chapter) will be employed to develop and test hypotheses.
The objective of the study is to determine empirically 
whether local government officials' budgeting decisions are 
affected by altering the frame of the various resource 
allocation alternatives under consideration. If such an 
effect is found, awareness of the impact of framing may 
serve to improve resource allocation decisions through the 
development of more comprehensive budget planning systems. 
For example, systems may be employed which prompt budgeting 
managers to address all pertinent issues prior to making 
resource allocation decisions among alternatives.® In other 
words, budget planning systems may be improved to draw 
attention to decisions in violation of statistically
®Northcraft and Neale [1986] present work in this area.
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sophisticated decision models such as a Bayesian or expected 
utility approach. While there is often no right answer for 
decision makers to select, local governmental decision 
makers should see the importance of not being misled into 
selection of an inferior course of action as a result of the 
mere presentation of the alternatives, rather than the 
objective differences among the alternatives.
HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES
Although the debate continues over the definition of 
rationality, there is wide acceptance of the belief that 
rational choice must be consistent and coherent [T&K, 1981, 
p. 453]. Consistency is assessed in terms of the subjects' 
decision preferences, which should not change as a result of 
alternative framing (i.e., rewording) of the same decision 
problem. Coherence of the subjects' decision preferences 
can be assessed in terms of deviations from the expected 
utility solutions for the decision problems. T&K have 
analyzed the responses of numerous different types of 
subjects (e.g., undergraduates, academicians, and physi­
cians) to cases similar to the cases employed in this study 
(see below).10 Their results indicate that even the more 
sophisticated subjects, such as academicians, systematically 
violate the theory of rational choice. This study will
lOgee chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of case 
selection and design. See Figure 1 of chapter 3 for the 
cases employed in this study.
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examine the responses of local governmental unit budgeting
managers (or officials) for violations of rational choice.
The proposition (P) of interest is stated below:
P: Budgeting managers tend to respond inconsistently
and incoherently to objectively identical resource 
allocation alternatives framed differently.
Thus, the null hypotheses can be stated as:
HI: The budget manager will not alter his decision
preferences between different frames of the same 
contingency.
H2: The budget manager will not alter his decision
preferences between different frames of the same 
outcome.
H3: The budget manager will choose the alternative
which maximizes expected utility.
Rejection of these hypotheses will lend support to the
claims that explanations of decision making processes
require more than an assumption of rational choice behavior
or an expected utility approach. That is, rejection
suggests that local budgeting managers do not respond
consistently (primarily related to HI and H2) and coherently
(H?) .
The dependent variable is the manager's choice or 
preference among alternatives related to the decision 
problem. This variable is dichotomous for each of the 
decision cases used in the study. The independent variable 
is the frame of the decision case. Although T&K identify 
three separate aspects of framing: acts, outcomes and
contingencies, the current study will be limited to the 
framing of contingencies and outcomes. This is seen as a
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necessary limitation to this research attempting to keep the 
necessary sample size at a reasonable level. Moreover, it 
is believed that the increased length of the instrument 
which would be required to adequately test all three aspects 
of framing would have a negative impact on the response 
rate.
Methodoloov
A sample of subjects will be randomly drawn from the 
U.S. Bureau of Census 1987 Directory of Governments listing 
of local governments serving populations of no more than 
10,000.
Subjects will be mailed a survey. The survey response 
form will be printed on bifold heavy gauge paper, which will 
require the subjects simply to fold the pre-addressed and 
stamped instrument, staple and mail. The brevity required 
to employ such a form, along with the convenience, should 
increase response rates. Accompanying the instrument will 
be a cover letter emphasizing the lack of attention paid to 
smaller local governments in the professional literature to 
date and the importance of their response in helping to fill 
that void. Subjects will be encouraged to return the 
instrument even if they choose not to participate in the 
study. To the extent this request is honored, this should 
eliminate doubt regarding subjects' receipt of the 
instrument, and thus eliminate one explanation for non­
response. In addition, the survey will be sent by first
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class mail rather than bulk rate in an effort to get the 
recipients' attention initially. The instrument will 
consist of a section for demographics and a few short cases.
CASE DESIGN & ANALYSES.
The cases will be designed to detect violations of 
expected utility theory in scenarios involving uncertainty 
in a resource allocation context.
The literature review served to emphasize several 
issues which seemingly require governmental decision makers 
at the local level to make decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty. For example, a review of the study published 
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) [1981], which addressed the changing needs of the 
1980's, provided some insight into the issues to be 
presented in the experimental cases. HUD and other sources 
in the current literature address the importance of 
maintaining infrastructure and the problems associated with 
such activity. Hoffman, Mister and Strawser [1988] discuss 
the decreasing availability of federal funds for local 
governments' infrastructure repair, replacement, or 
expansion needs. This situation of decreasing funds 
accompanied by increasing citizen activism (or expression of 
needs) makes the resource allocation decision making 
behavior of local officials an important issue. Similarly, 
the issue of unemployment and the need to layoff government 
employees is one of concern to many. Employment issues tend
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to draw attention nationwide, and certainly are of interest
to local constituencies.
Case construction is very important to the analysis of
decision making behavior in this study. In their
introduction of prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky [1979]
explained the use of individual cases to detect violations
of rational decision making behavior. In addition, they
explained the use of relationships among (or between)
multiple cases to support violations found with individual
cases as well as to detect further violations. The cases
presented in chapter 3 have attempted to incorporate the
characteristics of Kahneman and Tversky's cases in a manner
which allows analysis on an individual and a multiple case
level. The problems below illustrate how different frames
may be used to present objectively identical options to
these decision makers, invoking different responses.
Consider the following:
Decision makers may be faced with objectively 
identical alternatives presented in one of the 
following ways (problems 1 & 2 below). Regardless of 
the presentation form, the decision makers would be 
told that they have no hopes of obtaining the federal 
funding in question without the aid of the federal aid 
coordinator's expertise.
PROBLEM 1:
Your government has begun negotiations to hire a 
federal aid coordinator in efforts to improve your 
chances of obtaining federal funding for capital 
improvements and special programs. You know that the 
applicants for the coordinator position are also 
negotiating with other governmental units, and you 
estimate that you have a 25% chance of hiring one of 
the applicants. If you hire one of the specialists
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you feel absolutely confident that the coordinator can 
secure $150,000 for capital improvements by focusing 
all energies on a specific strategy, and you are 80% 
confident that the coordinator can secure $200,000 by 
pursuing an alternative strategy. Preliminary 
paperwork must be submitted for approval by the council 
before the hiring process is expected to be completed. 
Which one of the coordinator strategies would you 
choose to present to the council?
Strategy A: ($150,000) or
Strategy B: ($200,000, .80)
PROBLEM 2;
Your government's federal aid coordinator has two 
strategic options available for the current period's 
consideration. Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting 
in federal aid of $200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance 
of resulting in federal aid of $150,000. Which option 
would you encourage the coordinator to pursue:
Option Z: ($200,000, .2) or
Option Y: ($150,000, .25)
Researchers have found that even decidedly
sophisticated decision makers experience what T&K have
termed the "isolation effect" when faced with similarly
structured decision scenarios. That is, they ignore
elements in the decision process that are shared by all
alternatives. In the example case, decision makers are
expected to ignore the 25% chance of securing the
coordinator (as expressed in problem 1) because both actions
depend on successful completion of that initial part of the
process. Rational decision theory expects decision makers
to integrate the stages and not ignore the initial 25%
chance. Problem 2 integrates the steps for the decision
maker. That is, 20% is derived from the joint probabilities
(25%— chance of reaching stage 2— and 80%). When faced with
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the alternatives in the integrated problem, decision makers 
make the rational choice of higher expected value. This 
study will rely on a pilot study to investigate whether 
subjects ignore (or isolate) either the probability or the 
absolute dollar amount of the options in Problem 2 when 
making their decisions. When faced with the alternatives in 
the nonintegrated problem, decision makers have been found 
not to choose the higher expected value of the second step. 
Ignoring the effect of the first step, they often select the 
"sure" thing over a chance for a little something more.
This has been termed the "certainty effect." Remarkably, 
researchers have found subjects tend not to integrate even 
when prompted to do so. Thus, the decisions made can be 
significantly different for alternative presentations of 
objectively identical information. The isolation and 
certainty effects are addressed in chapter two along with a 
more detailed presentation of prospect theory and framing.
In addition, efforts to maximize the experimental 
realism of the task will include solicitation of comments 
from a city manager. Once the instrument has been reviewed 
and modified where necessary, a pilot study will be 
conducted using Baton Rouge area small government managers 
as subjects. The pilot study should allow possible sources 
of confusion with the task to be detected as well as 
indicate potential weaknesses in the methodology, in 
general.
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Subjects will be asked to choose between alternative 
courses of action (such as the above example) requiring 
equal allocations of available resources. This is to remove 
budget limitations as a reason for proposal rejection.
Subjects' responses will be compared to the expected 
utility response frequencies anticipated for each set of 
alternatives. Deviations from expected utility solutions 
will be analyzed in light of the principles of prospect 
theory. For instance, as explained with the above example, 
rational decision theory assumes decision makers will choose 
the highest expected utility alternative based on integrated 
information in the case of two-stage decision problems. 
Prospect theory proposes that decision makers ignore the 
common elements among alternatives (e.g., the 25% chance of 
moving on to step two of the decision problem) and base 
their decision on the illusory certainty (or 
pseudocertainty) associated with the unique elements of the 
alternatives. In addition to the investigation for 
isolation effects, the cases will investigate the effects of 
framing alternatives in terms of gains or losses from the 
decision maker's reference point. This issue is discussed 
in greater detail in chapter two; however, a brief 
description follows.
l^Kee et al. [1987] found limited funds to be the most 
important reason for rejecting investment proposals.
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Basically, prospect theory explains risk aversion and 
risk seeking behavior by focusing on the decision maker's 
point of reference. Whereas expected utility theory assumes 
that decision makers will respond consistently to various 
framings of objectively identical information, prospect 
theory finds that decision makers are influenced by the 
perspective forced on them by the decision frame. When the 
decision problem is framed in terms of a gain from the 
decision maker's reference point prospect theory anticipates 
risk averse behavior in the choice among alternatives. When 
the objectively identical information is framed in terms of 
a loss from the decision maker's reference point, prospect 
theory anticipates risk seeking behavior.
Responses to the cases will be evaluated in terms of 
the consistency and coherency requirements of rational 
choice theory. Coherence will be analyzed by comparing the 
correct expected utility solutions (in applicable cases—  
some cases will be identical to the alternative in terms of 
expected utility, i.e., no "correct" solution) to the 
observed decision preferences. For example, the case 
presented earlier in this chapter has a correct response 
(i.e., the alternatives are not of equal expected value). 
Rational decision theory requires decision makers to choose 
alternative B in problem 1, based on integrated information 
regarding the two-step problem, and alternative Z in problem
2. Consistency will be analyzed by comparing the
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frequencies of directional preferences (risk aversion or 
risk seeking) as discussed below.
Each case elicits dichotomous responses which satisfy 
the criteria for classification as binomial distributions 
[Levin, 1984, p. 215]. In testing whether the sample data 
support the null hypothesis that the sampled population 
responses do follow binomial distributions, the Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test will be employed, given scenarios where 
the expected utility between alternatives is objectively 
identical. That is, the Chi-square test will be used where 
the expected frequencies are 50%-50% for the two alternative 
courses of action. According to Daniel [1978, p. 256], the 
goodness-of-fit test should not be used for categories with 
an expected frequency of less than one, such as where one 
alternative is objectively better. Consequently, a 
nonparametric binomial test will be used to analyze 
responses to scenarios which have alternatives of different 
expected utilities (e.g., the example case above).
Expected Contribution
Several of the works cited above have extended calls 
for additional research. These calls emphasize significant 
gaps in the current governmental budgeting and psychology of 
choice literatures. This study suggests that the call for 
additional research be answered by focusing on a managerial 
accounting issue within a local governmental entity. By 
employing prospect theory the study will attempt to
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determine empirically whether local government managers' 
budgeting decisions are affected by altering the frame of 
the various resource allocation alternatives under 
consideration. If such an effect is found, awareness of the 
impact of framing may serve to improve resource allocation 
decisions through the development and incorporation of more 
comprehensive budget planning systems.
This chapter provides background information concerning 
the budgeting environment of local governments and some 
behavioral aspects of the budgeting process at the local 
government level. The chapter also defines the purpose and 
objectives of the proposed study. The research effort is 
viewed as a worthwhile focus in light of the numerous calls 
for expansion of the governmental budgeting and behavioral 
research knowledge base. The demographic data collected 
should be of significant interest, given claims of 
insufficient empirical focus to date on small local 
governmental units. For example, the literature claims that 
local budget managers are appointed rather than elected as 
in state and federal governmental units. Demographics 
collected by this study will provide empirical evidence to 
support or refute that claim.
The prospect theory approach is believed to be 
warranted because of its potential contributions (above 
those of expected utility theory) toward a more complete 
understanding of the decision making process under
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uncertainty. A better understanding of the planning/ 
decision making aspects of the budgetary process may have 
significant practical implications for the local government 
entity as well as its constituents. Once a weakness in a 
system (such as framing of resource allocation options 
without conscious awareness) is identified, remedial steps 
can be implemented. Such steps might include development of 
intentionally structured frames which induce sufficient 
consideration of all resource allocation options available 
to the budget manager. As Naisbett [1984] noted, the 
demands placed on local governmental units are growing in 
number and intensity. A better understanding of the status 
of decision making within such units may allow for improved 
approaches to the task and a more favorable working 
environment for the decision making personnel.
Summary
This chapter has been employed as an introduction to 
the proposed study and relevant background. The need for 
increased attention to the resource allocation decisions 
made by local governments has been addressed, and the 
perceived benefit of a prospect theory approach to decision 
making under such conditions of uncertainty has been 
presented. The remaining chapters will include a review of 
literatures relevant to local government and decision 
making, a detailed explanation of the proposed methodology, 
analysis of the data, and conclusions of the research.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE RELEVANT TO THE STUDY 
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL DECISION MAKING 
IN THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS
The purpose of chapter two is to provide a review and 
summary of literature relevant to this research. This 
chapter will also highlight the contributions to the 
literature which will be made by the current study. The 
relevant research areas include:
1. Literature on the theory or concepts of the 
budgeting function,
2. Reviews of work on local governments,
3. Empirical budgeting research at the local level,
4. The introduction and development of prospect 
theory, and
5. Applications of prospect theory in accounting and 
business.
The Budgeting Function
SCHICK
Schick's [1966] essay, "The Road to PPB: The Stages to 
Budget Reform," is viewed as a significant contribution to 
governmental budgeting theory. His presentation of the 
functions of budgeting has been used by academicians and 
practitioners interested in understanding the literature and 
practices of budgeting. The value of the essay is seen to 
be the development of the general constructs which lay a 
foundation (or conceptual framework) for the design and 
performance of empirical research in budgeting. Schick 
maintains that the budget and the budgetary process is a
29
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means of (1) control - insuring legal compliance and 
monitoring spending; (2) management - delivering services in 
an efficient manner; and (3) planning - establishing goals 
and evaluating alternative courses of action. According to 
Schick, American governments' emphasis in the budgeting 
process has progressed over time from the former to the 
latter of his constructs.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
In 1978, the Comptroller General of the United States 
published twelve standards for internal management control, 
three of which validate the importance of Schick's [1966] 
three functions of budgeting. One additional standard 
(No.8) is believed to be relevant to the focus of this 
research effort, and is presented last. The specific 
standards of interest to the current study are presented as 
[1978, p.35]:
Standard No.l: Policies. Management policies adopted 
for carrying out agency functions should be clearly 
stated; systematically communicated throughout the 
organization; conformed to applicable laws and external 
regulations and policies; and designed to promote the 
carrying out of authorized activities effectively, 
efficiently, and economically.
Standard No.4: Planning. A system of forward 
planning, embracing all significant parts of the 
agency, is needed for determining and justifying needs 
for financial, property, and personnel resources and 
for carrying out operations effectively, efficiently, 
and economically.
Standard No.11: Expenditure Control. Adequate control
over expenditures requires that effective procedures be 
devised to provide assurance that needed goods and 
services are acquired at the lowest possible cost; that
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goods and services paid for are actually received; that 
quality, quantity, and prices are in accordance with 
the applicable contracts or other authorization; that 
such authorizations are consistent with applicable 
statutes, regulations, and policies; and that effective 
use is made of all acquired resources.
Standard No.8: Accuracy. Reliability, and Materiality.
In determining the degree of precision to be sought in 
making allocations of cost (expense) or revenue or in 
computing other items where judgments and estimates are 
employed, the materiality and relative significance of 
the items involved should be considered carefully. 
Meticulous procedures which do not produce materially 
more accurate results or provide other off-setting 
benefits should be avoided.
The Schick typology and these standards appear to lend
themselves to a study of behavioral issues within the
governmental sector, especially within governmental
budgeting.
ERVIN
Ervin [1980] surveyed 385 chief budget administrators 
of 252 Illinois municipalities, which had populations of at 
least 100,000. Ervin elicited the administrators' 
perceptions of the functions served by their particular 
municipal budgeting system. The officials were asked to 
respond to 51 Likert-type items derived from Schick's essay
[1966], which were then factor analyzed.
Figure 2.1 shows the three factors hypothesized from 
Schick's typology. Only the five highest factor-loading 
items which Ervin used to interpret the three factors are 
included in the abstraction from Ervin's table of factor
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FIGURE 2.1
Ervin's [1980] Loading on Schick's Constructs of Budgeting
Hypothesized Control Indicators
1. Comparison of current expenditure estimates with 
actual expenditures of previous years
2. Accurate estimation of revenues
3. The work of the finance office in assuring monies 
are spent appropriately
4. Conformance with the legal fiscal requirements of 
the state
5. Inclusion of self-supporting funds in the budget 
of appropriations ordinance
Hypothesized Management Indicators
1. Establishment of work standards
2. Scheduling and control of work
3. Recruitment of well-trained analysts and 
technicians
4 - Work measurement
5. Development of efficient work methods 
Hypothesized Planning Indicators
1. Discussion and development of community goals
2. Evaluation of ongoing services and programs
3. Efforts to match future resources with future 
needs
4. Review of long-range plans
5. Anticipation of future events that might effect 
community finances
loadings (Figure 2.1).^
^Ervin used ten additional items to interpret the three 
factors. Together, the 25 items accounted for 86% of the 
total variance. Additional factors did not have high enough 
loadings to allow for interpretation of the underlying 
dimensions.
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A review of Figure 2.1 indicates that while the three
constructs hypothesized by Schick are, indeed, present in
the orientations, practices, and activities of municipal
budgeting, the management and planning constructs are not as
representative of Schick's constructs. Ervin [p.126]
suggests more accurate characterizations of the management
and planning constructs to be "management-analysis"
(concerned with day-to-day analyses and problem-solving) and
"planning-futures" (concerned with futuristic projections
and goals). Ervin [p.121] concludes that:
there is a need for budgetary concepts and theory that 
are more generic in nature, allowing a framework for 
description and comparison independent of the emergence 
and demise of particular techniques and approaches. 
Schick's typology of budget functions is such a theory 
and deserves continued testing, elaboration, and 
refinement.
FREEMAN, NEIMI AND WILSON
The authors [1983] present a guide for local officials 
in the evaluation of public expenditures. Freeman et al. 
state that local officials should not restrict their 
concerns to budgetary effects of public programs, but should 
also consider other important effects which may influence 
the community's perception of the programs. Figure 2.2 
presents an illustration of the authors' steps in the 
analysis of public programs.
Although the valuable time of skilled personnel is 
required. Freeman et al. suggest the use of in-house
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
34
analysts for program analysis of local government operations 
as being more efficient and effective than use of
FIGURE 2.2 
Steps for Analyzing Public Programs 
(from Freeman, Niemi, and Wilson, 1983)
DEFINE SITUATION1
ASSESS EQUITY IMPACTS
DISCOUNT COSTS AND BENEFITS
INTERPRET RESULTS OF 
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
IDENTIFY, MEASURE AND 
VALUE PROGRAM'S COSTS
IDENTIFY, MEASURE AND 
VALUE PROGRAM'S BENEFITS
consultants. They suggest that studies performed in-house 
be considered investments in the knowledge and skill of 
personnel. Their views support maintaining the budgeting 
function within local governmental units and emphasize the 
need to understand its weaknesses. An identification and 
understanding of such weaknesses should lead toward 
improvement in the resource allocation process as well as 
greater security for employees of the governmental unit.
Freeman et al. [p.104] present a checklist for local 
officials to determine whether a program has been adequately 
analyzed. The checklist is presented in Figure 2.3, below. 
The importance of answering such questions cannot be denied;
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however, the degree of guidance offered by such a checklist 
is questionable. Admittedly, a checklist of detailed and 
situation-specific items would prove impractical for all 
local governmental budgeting needs, but the items mentioned 
in Figure 2.3 appear to be extremely vague.
FIGURE 2.3 
Analysis Review Checklist 
(from Freeman, Neimi, and Wilson, 1983)
1. Have the program's objectives been clearly and 
completely stated?
2. Has the population affected by the program and 
relevant to the analysis be identified?
3. Have the program's costs been estimated correctly?
Have any (budget or nonbudget) costs been over­
looked or overweighted?
4. Have the program's benefits been estimated correctly?
Have all of the benefits been identified, 
correctly counted and weighted?
5. Has the time value of money been accounted for by 
discounting (with an appropriate discount rate) those 
future costs and benefits for which dollar values can 
be determined?
6. Have the program's distributional impacts been 
considered?
7. Have the findings of the analysis been tested for 
their sensitivity to changes in assumptions about the 
magnitude of important costs or benefits?
GEORGE
George [1974] addressed the concept of "decision 
stress" in decision making situations such as those facing
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persons responsible for formulating the budget of a 
governmental unit. Such persons must assess the expected 
utility of a variety of alternative courses of action. As 
mentioned in chapter one, those assessments are not made in 
isolation, but under the scrutiny of a multitude of parties 
concerned with their own interests.
George recognizes cognitive limits on rational choice, 
and explains that several intellectual difficulties 
undermine legitimate efforts of rational calculation within 
a political environment such as budgeting. According to 
George [p.180]:
1. The political decision maker often must operate 
with incomplete, possibly erroneous, information 
about the situation at hand.
2. His knowledge of ends-means relationships is 
generally inadequate to enable him to predict with 
confidence the consequences of choosing one or 
another course of action.
3. It is often difficult for him to formulate a 
single criterion of value by virtue of which to 
choose the "best" of alternative options.
The research efforts referred to above highlight the 
need for an understanding of the decision making process in 
situations where judgment plays a significant role in 
determining an outcome. As described above, the budgeting 
process places the governmental manager in such a 
situation.
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EADIE AND STEINBACHER
In their recent work with the Ohio Bureau of Employment 
Services, Eadie and Steinbacher [1985, p.430] propose 
strategic agenda management as a combination of 
organizational development efforts with strategic planning 
techniques. However, they state that planning techniques 
are " . . .  subordinate to the human process of painful, time 
consuming decision making based on the best available 
information (emphasis in original)." Furthermore, they 
believe that as human capabilities increase, the strength of 
formal planning mechanics used increases. Their 
observations and recommendations regarding the planning 
process are presented in a vague conceptual manner, much 
like George [1974] above.
Reviews of Studies at the Local Level
CORNIA AND USHER
Cornia and Usher [1981] have found the majority of
budgeting literature to focus on federal and state levels of
government- Lack of attention to local budgeting in the
literature contributes to the extension of federal and state
level research findings to local governments as well.
However, the authors present several reasons why such an
extension may not be warranted;
1. Constraints placed on the budget officer are 
different at the federal, state and local levels (e.g., 
federal is not required to submit a balanced budget);
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2. Revenue sources at the local level are less 
responsive to economic change; and
3. Elected officials (e.g., President or Governor) may 
play a different role in the budget process than an 
appointed official (e.g., city manager).
The authors have noted that most of the few published
works on local budgeting have used a case study approach or
a very limited sample of cities. For example, Crecine
[1967] focused on Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland in his
development of a computer simulation of the budgeting
process. One of the major conclusions of Crecine*s work was
that increases in external revenue sources leads to
increased budget requests. He found the mayor's or city
manager's budget letter to influence budget preparation.
Furthermore, Crecine suggested that pre-structured budget
forms may play an important role in determining expenditure
policy. Meltzner [1971] is another example of a case study.
Meltzner researched the budgeting process of Oakland,
California, as a participant observer. He found that
especially during the final stages of balancing the budget,
fiscal control, rather than the expected outcome of proposed
expenditures, was the main concern.
Cornia and Usher have found that budgeting studies tend
to emphasize the results of the budgeting process, ignoring
the decision-making process. In their review of the budget
preparation manuals of 86 cities with populations of at
least 100,000 in 1975, Cornia and Usher [p.89] concluded:
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It seems that municipal budgeting has progressed from a 
tedium item-by-item examination of proposed 
expenditures to a more complex decision-making 
process. While the former process was implicitly 
incremental, the latter is explicitly incremental as a 
result of the translation of the base concept and 
disjointed incrementalism into practical modes of 
budgetary analysis. The result in either case may be 
incrementalism, but municipal budget decisions may now 
be more "rational" at least at the margin!
HONADLE
Honadle [1983] provides a guide to the literature on 
public administration in rural and small jurisdictions for 
the period 1960 through 1981. Her review was partially in 
response to the perceived neglect of nonmetropolitan and 
small governments in the United States despite the fact that 
a majority of Americans are served by such governmental 
units. Honadle [p. xvi] cites, "Consider Public 
Administration Review, the leading journal in the field. 
Except for one special symposium in 1980, PAR has paid 
almost no attention to the special problems of rural public 
administration." Regarding the capital budgeting issue, 
Honadle found a single study conducted in 1973, on a rural 
community of approximately 20,000 people.
The literature review includes approximately 20 
journals, dissertation abstracts, government documents, 
computerized literature searches of three databases, and 
selected reports. As a result of the extensive review, 
Honadle concludes that there is a public administration 
literature focusing on rural areas and smaller
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jurisdictions. Not only are there distinctions to be 
recognized between larger, urban jurisdictions and smaller, 
rural jurisdictions, but there are distinctions to be 
recognized among the smaller, rural governments. Honadle 
[p. xxi] states that, "Perhaps the most crucial finding is 
that one should not overgeneralize about 'the rural 
community' or 'the small town.'" Although not universally 
applicable across all such jurisdictions, several common 
characteristics were identified. Some of Honadle's findings 
are presented by headings below:
Population Density. Urban areas, generally, have 
higher concentrations of people than rural areas. This 
state allows urban areas to provide both general and 
specialized services to its inhabitants, whereas rural areas 
are limited to the provision of general services which are 
required by the majority of its people. There appears to be 
an inverse relationship between population density of a 
jurisdiction and cost of services provided. A direct 
relationship seems evident between population density and 
service quality and availability.
Lack of Expertise and Human Resources. This situation 
is seen as being directly tied to the lack of fiscal 
resources of rural jurisdictions and training opportunities 
for rural personnel. This common characteristic has 
significant implications for rural governments.
Understaffing and inadequate job performance generally
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contribute to a low quality and quantity of services 
provided by rural units as well as neglect of most (if not 
all) long-range planning. Many jurisdictions have been 
found to use personnel in multiple roles and/or employ a 
shared or "circuit riding" manager in attempts to lessen the 
squeeze of tight fiscal constraints.
Resistance to Innovation. There appears to be a 
resistance to innovation among rural citizens and agencies. 
Cited reasons for such attitudes include perceived excessive 
costs, ineffectiveness, and views that governmental units 
are not as capable of providing the innovative services as 
are individuals and private enterprise. Honadle and others 
suggest the need to show quick results as well as the merit 
of innovation in order to lessen such resistance.
STALLINGS AND FERRIS
Stallings and Ferris [1988] provide an analysis of 
actual data for five-year intervals on characteristics of 
research reported in Public Administration Review (PAR).
The review covers the 45 year period from 1940 through 1984. 
The authors chose to focus on PAR because it is ". . . the 
official journal of the main professional organization, it 
is most representative of research of general interest to 
the field over a long time period."
A random sample of 176 articles from the period 1940 
through 1974 was taken and the title, abstract, 
acknowledgements, section headings, and all tables and
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figures were examined. The entire text was read only when 
the initial screening was inadequate for coding. Stallings 
and Ferris added their review of 176 articles to 289 
articles from the period 1975 through 1984 reviewed by Perry 
and Kraemer [1986]. One of the major interests during the 
review was any trend in research attention across federal, 
state, and local levels of government. Stallings and Ferris 
note that local government studies have never been a major 
research focus. Table 2.1 shows that local government 
research has always represented less than one-fourth of the 
published work in PAR.
The conclusions drawn from their review include 
Stallings' and Ferris' belief that characteristics of recent 
work in PAR differ very little from published work of nearly 
fifty years prior. According to Stallings and Ferris 
[p.583]:
Research is still dominated by efforts to 
conceptualize researchable problems, delineate 
possible areas of inquiry, and describe objects for 
study. Little causal analysis or theory testing has 
taken place over the years, and causal analyses, while 
significantly more frequent now than in previous 
decades, comprise only a small proportion of current 
research.
While Stallings and Ferris believe PAR provides a good 
indication of the profession's views of research, they offer 
three reasons why article-length research may be 
underrepresented in PAR:
1. Researchers may submit elsewhere,
2. PAR editors may be opposed to publishing results of 
individual research efforts, and
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3. The peer review process may eliminate a majority of 
submitted research efforts due to questionably 
sound methodology.
Furthermore, the authors believe that public administration
has been clinging to its practitioner focus too long. They
suggest that fundamental questions must be asked about the
nature of the public sector and its relationships with
society in order to bring about new directions in public
administration research.
TABLE 2.1
Local Level of Government Emphasized in Articles 
in the Public Administration Review. 1940-1984 
(from Stallings and Ferris, 1988)
Interval Percent of 
Articles
Number of 
Articles
1940-44 5.3 1
1945-49 0.0 0
1950-54 5.3 1
1955-59 9.1 2
1960—64 20.0 4
1965-69 23.2 7
1970-74 22.2 10
1975-79 *
1980-84 *
11.41
df 6
P 0.08
Cramer's V 0.20
*Due to the type of coding technique used by 
Perry and Kraemer [1986] (authors reviewing this 
time interval), these values are too small to 
report.
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Empirical Capital Budgeting Research at the Local Level
SOKOLOW AND HONADLE
Based on available studies, Sokolow and Honadle [1984, 
p.373] state that a "centralized executive budget is widely 
viewed as the predominant form of local government budgeting 
in the United States.However, the authors noted that the 
studies, almost exclusively, focused on larger local 
governmental units. Moreover, the few studies to be found 
on smaller governmental unit practices " . . .  offer the 
obvious generalization that expertise and professionalism 
are in short supply."
Sokolow and Honadle use a case study approach to 
investigate the annual budgeting process of small and rural 
governments. Their work is an addition to the literature as 
a result of their definition of "small" government.3 
Sokolow and Honadle believe that units with populations of
50,000 or more (the lower limit for most small government 
research) may not be comparable to units of much smaller 
size. Thus, they examine the practices of eight
^The authors refer to the following works; Thomas J. 
Anton, Budgeting in Three Illinois Cities (Urbana, IL: 
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of 
Illinois, 1964); J. Richard Aronson and Eli Schwartz (eds.), 
Management Policies in Local Government Finance (Washington, 
D.C.: International City Management Association, 1975) ch.4; 
and Lewis Friedman, Budgeting Municipal Expenditures: A 
Studv in Comparative Policv Making (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1975).
^The MFOA defines "small" as governments serving less 
than 100,000.
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municipalities (with populations between 1,600 and 4,000) 
and four counties (with populations between 11,000 and
21,000). All twelve governments were located in Illinois or 
California.
The authors used a simplified version of the executive 
budgeting process (see Figure 2.4) in reviewing the 
budgeting process of the twelve governments. They noted 
only three of the stages shown in Figure 2.4 in all twelve 
governments; compilation (stage 4), approval (stage 7), and 
execution (stage 8) . Four major deviations from the 
executive process were noted and are described below.
Executive Policv. The most formal governments provided 
guidance (procedural steps) by establishing calendars and 
standard worksheets, but only a few of the governments had 
administrators who offered advice and suggestions at the 
outset. Sokolow and Honadle did not consider those 
administrators as providing executive policy because they 
did not control later action.
Department Proposals. This aspect ranged from 
elaborate proposals accompanied by background material to 
simple statements with a few figures typed on a single 
paper. At this stage, much was based on the clerks' 
personal knowledge, estimates and informal consultations 
with others.
Revenue Estimates. This stage varied widely in the 
amount of attention it received during the budgeting
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FIGURE 2.4 
Simplified Executive Budget Process 
(from Solokow and Honadle, 1984)
Executive executes
Departments prepare spending requests
Finance staff prepares revenue estimates, etc.
Legislature reviews, revises, approves
Executive compiles requests, other information
Executive presents document as his budget 
with budget message
Executive sets budget policy for departments, 
coordinates later steps
Executive reviews material, reconciles 
expenditures and revenues, revises into 
a new document
process. The California governments emphasized this stage 
and the importance of such information. The authors feel 
this was a result of tax-cutting activism (e.g.. Proposition
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13) in that state. In contrast to the California
governments, the Illinois governments gave the revenue
estimation stage far less attention. Many municipalities
did not even require this information.
Executive Review and Recommendations. Sokolow and
Honadle found this to be the area where the executive budget
model was most violated by the twelve governments under
study. They found the following condition [p.376]:
No budget in the 12 rural communities was presented to 
the legislative body as a product of an executive's 
priorities and revisions. In most cases the spending 
proposals considered by the governing board were merely 
collections of original departmental requests. No 
executive "messages" were forwarded along with the 
budget or appropriations documents. Entirely absent in 
the process was the extensive analysis, review, and 
revision considered to be the responsibility of a 
strong manager or other official in an executive budget 
process. Some administrative manipulation or revision 
of spending requests and other information did occur 
before legislative review. City clerks, county 
auditors, and other officials who compiled 
departmental requests or drafted appropriation 
ordinances were in a position to suggest or actually 
make changes.
As described above, the executive budget process was 
not as extensive as the model (Figure 2.4). Consequently, 
legislative actions played a much larger part in the budget 
process. Because of the lack of executive-originated 
recommendations regarding expenditure priorities, etc., the 
majority of the budget deliberations were conducted by the 
city council and county boards of supervisors. In one city, 
advisory commissions (one council member and several
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citizens appointed by the council) consulted with department
heads in the request for funds.
Sokolow and Honadle found that a single official
sometimes dominated the entire budget process by not only
controlling the procedural work but also exercising
influence over others involved in the process. The
influence was found to be both formal and informal in
nature. Because the city clerks were the only full-time
generalist officials for their communities, they were often
the central figures in preparation of the budget. For
example, consider the difference between the roles of the
following two clerks studied by the authors [p.379-380];
In the first city the clerk estimated revenues, 
compiled expenditure requests from other officials, and 
prepared all budget materials for the council. She 
served also as the principal supplier of factual 
information (comparisons with past expenditures, state 
legisls ive developments, and so on) to the council 
during its budget deliberations.
The clerk in the second city, by contrast, did not 
hesitate to offer opinions and intervene in other parts 
of the process, in addition to coordinating and 
compiling the budget. Her influence was exercised in 
two ways— by aggressively advising department heads 
about the contents of their proposals and the 
strategies of dealing with the council, and by offering 
suggestions to individual legislators or to the entire 
council at their budget sessions.
In conclusion of their field research, the authors feel
many improvements are possible regarding budgetary
procedures of small governments (populations well under
50,000). As Sokolow and Honadle [p.382] state:
Certainly this cannot be accomplished with lasting 
effect by giving small governments advice and
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techniques that require full-time chief executives with 
finance staffs to implement fully. . . A more 
meaningful approach to the improvement of budgetary 
practices in rural local governments is to work with 
existing resources and arrangements— to offer advice 
and training to elected administrators and members of 
legislative bodies that is consistent with their 
multiple responsibilities and time limitations.
KEE, ROBBINS AND APOSTOLOU
In an attempt to fill the void in the literature 
regarding any assessment of the current budgeting practices 
of municipal governments, Kee et al. [1987] surveyed 200 
municipal finance officers of cities having populations of
50,000 or more. The officers were randomly selected from 
the Directory: Municipal Officers of U.S. Cities, and a 
response rate of 49% was achieved.
Figure 2.5 provides a profile of the respondents. It 
is interesting to note that 26% had only baccalaureate 
degrees and 5% had no formal education at all. It is also 
interesting to see that 58% of the respondents majored in 
accounting and finance, but preferred capital budgeting 
techniques less sophisticated than the net present value 
(NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR) techniques, which are 
considered optimal in finance literature. In asking why NPV 
or IRR were not used, the authors found the two most 
frequent responses to be (1) the inability to incorporate 
qualitative aspects, and (2) political factors. Both of 
these reasons may allow for a capital budgeting process
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Kee,
FIGURE 2.5 
Characteristics of Respondents to the 
et al., [1987] Survey of Municipal Finance Officers
FORMAL EDUCATION:
Highest Level of Study 
Undergraduate 
Graduate 
Other 
TOTAL
Number
24
63
92
Percent
26
69
5
100
ACADEMIC SPECIALIZATION:
Area
Accounting
Public Administration
Other
TOTAL
Number
35
17
29
81
Percent
43
21
36
100
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Governmental Financial Affairs Number Percent
Less than 1 year 1 1
1 to 4 years 17 18
5 to 9 years 22 23
Over 10 years 55 58
TOTAL 95 100
Budgeting Capital Projects Number Perc(
Less than 1 year 4 4
1 to 4 years 30 32
5 to 9 years 19 20
Over 10 years 42 44
TOTAL 95 100
Questionnaires with blank responses were not included in 
the number (percent) responding to the Kee, et al., survey. 
Consequently, the total responses for certain questions may 
be less than 97.
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which may be influenced by the presentation or discussion 
of issues (i.e., framing).
One other aspect of the Kee et al. study which may 
create an environment best tested with prospect theory is 
the analysis of risk. Seventy-nine percent of the 
respondents claimed risk to be a primary concern in capital 
budgeting. Surprisingly, 39% of the respondents rely solely 
on nonquantitative procedures for analyzing risk. Thus, 
perhaps due to the significant role political and social 
considerations play in municipal asset selection, risk 
analysis by many municipal managers (of cities with 
populations greater than 50,000) is "highly subjective and 
unsophisticated." Consequently, Kee et al. [p.22] conclude 
that " . . .  considerable room exists for improving municipal 
capital budgeting decisions."
Introduction and Development of Prospect Theory
As mentioned in chapter one, most of the literature 
through the 1970s which focused on decision making under 
risk relied on expected utility theory. John von Newmann 
and Oskar Horgenstern [1944] developed the theory as a 
formal decision criterion which served two important 
purposes: (i) it provided an axiomatic basis for a theory
of decision making under uncertainty and (2) it incorporated 
attitudes toward risk in the utility function. Expected 
utility theory was developed to suggest how individuals 
should behave under conditions of uncertainty (i.e..
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normative). However, researchers have relied on expected 
utility theory as an accurate predictive model of how people 
will act. Among the arguments for the use of utility theory 
in normative analysis is the fact that optimal decisions 
increase the chances for survival among competitors.
One of the axioms of expected utility theory is 
transitivity. The theory holds that decision makers 
identify all possible states of the environment as well as 
the outcomes associated with each state. Once the 
identification is accomplished, individuals' preferences are 
assumed to be transitive over the set of outcomes. That is, 
if an individual chooses outcome #1 over outcome #2 and 
outcome #2 over outcome #3, then the individual must choose 
outcome #1 over outcome #3.
Moreover, expected utility theory requires decision 
makers to not only choose the appropriate probabilities for 
each of the possible states of a decision, but to apply the
rules of probability theory in determining the probability
of compound events as well. For example, a basic law of 
probability, the extension rule, states that if A contains 
B, then P(A) > P(B). Kahneman and Tversky [K&T, 1979; T&K,
1974, 1982 and 1986] note that decision makers often violate
such rules of probability and requirements of expected 
utility theory. A part of their argument is based on the 
use of heuristics, which is not the focus of the current 
study. However, much of their argument is presented in
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terms of prospect theory. Thus, the fundamentals of their 
theory are discussed below.
KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky published a critique of 
expected utility theory and presented their alternative 
model of decision making under risk, prospect theory. They 
found two significant behaviors to be present in choices 
among risky prospects: (1) certainty effect and (2)
isolation effect. The two stage decision process assumed by 
prospect theory and the way they relate to the certainty and 
isolation effects are discussed below.
Certaintv Effect. This term is used to describe the 
overweighting of outcomes that are guaranteed (or viewed as 
certain), relative to outcomes viewed as less than certain 
(or probable). Kahneman and Tversky [p.265] use a variation 
of Allais' [1953] counter-example to expected utility theory 
as a very simple illustration of the use of their term: 
Choose between
A: 2,500 with probability 0.33 B: 2,400 with
2,400 with probability 0.66 certainty
0 with probability 0.Ô1
Only 18% chose A, which has the higher expected utility.
Isolation Effect. Kahneman and Tversky note that
decision makers often simplify their task by ignoring
elements that all of the alternatives have in common. The
problem with such behavior is that the alternatives can be
decomposed in common and uncommon elements in numerous ways,
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leading to different preferences. The authors [p.271] make
their point with the following problem:
Consider the following 2-stage game. In the first 
stage, there is a probability of 0.75 to end the game 
without winning anything, and a probability of 0.25 to 
move into the second stage. If you reach the second 
stage, you have a choice between
(4,000, 0.80) and (3000)
Your choice must be made before the game starts, i.e., 
before the outcome of the first stage is known.
In terms of the final outcomes, the choices are (4,000,
0.20) and (3,000, 0.25) due to the 25% chance of getting to
stage two.
Figure 2.6 shows how decomposition of the problem may 
lead to different decisions. The standard formulation shows 
the appropriate composition of the two-stage game. The 25% 
chance of reaching stage 2 is incorporated into the 
alternatives available at stage 2. For example, there is a 
25% chance of reaching stage 2 and if reached there is an 
80% chance to obtain 4000. Thus, there is a (80% x 25%) 20% 
chance to obtain 4000. This is a notable contrast to the 
perceived 80% chance for 4000 when a sequential process is 
applied. By processing the stages of the game in sequence, 
the 25% chance of reaching stage two is ignored in the 
consideration of choices available once stage two is reached 
because both alternatives of stage 2 depend on reaching 
stage 2. In other words, the alternatives at stage 2 are 
evaluated as if stage 2 exists in isolation of stage one.
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Sequential and Standard Formulation 
for Problem Evaluation
55
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
(standard formulation)
(sequential formulation)
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
0
0
FIGURE 2.7 
Editing Operations of Prospect Theory 
(from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
Coding - outcomes may be coded as gains or losses in 
relation to the reference point;
Combination - probabilities associated with identical 
outcomes may be combined;
Segregation - riskless components of a prospect are set 
apart;
Cancellation - components shared by prospects may be 
discarded;
Simplification - probabilities and outcomes are rounded;
Dominance - clearly dominated prospects are discarded.
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Thus, the sequential formulation has a certainty advantage 
associated with the 3,000. Kahneman and Tversky note that 
The reversal of preferences due to the dependency among 
events is particularly significant because it violated the 
basic supposition of a decision-theoretical analysis, that 
choice between prospects is determined solely by the 
probabilities of final states.
The same behavior was found regarding representations 
of outcomes rather than probabilities. When given 1000 and 
a choice between a sure 500 or a 50% chance for 1000, 84% of 
the subjects chose the sure 500. However, when given 2000 
and a choice between a sure reduction of 500 or a 50% chance 
of a reduction of 1000, 69% of the subjects chose the 
gamble. The two problems have identical final states.
The Phases. The departures from expected utility 
theory (like those presented above) are addressed by 
Kahneman and Tversky's explanation of the decision making 
process. There are two stages in the choice process, 
according to prospect theory: editing and evaluation.
Editing is the process of simplifying the task of choosing 
among alternatives of uncertainty (see Figure 2.7 for a list 
of editing operations). Evaluation is the process of 
comparing edited prospects and choosing the one with the 
highest value. Prospect theory assumes that editing 
operations are not mutually exclusive and are performed 
whenever possible. Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
57
[p.275] state, ”. . .  the preference order between prospects 
need not be invariant across contexts, because the same 
offered prospect could be edited in different ways depending 
on the context in which it appears.4”
The evaluation phase can be explained in terms of the 
modifications to the underlying general linear form of 
expected utility theory. Prospect theory assumes that 
values attach to changes. In contrast, expected utility 
theory assumes values attach to final states. The effect of 
these different assumptions can at least partially be seen 
in Figure 2.6 (sequential and standard processes). Prospect 
theory also departs from expected utility theory by assuming 
that decision weights are not equal to stated probabilities. 
The value function and decision weights of prospect theory 
are described below.
The Value Function. Kahneman and Tversky claim that an 
essential aspect of prospect theory is the idea that changes 
in wealth or welfare, rather than final states, carry value. 
They state [p.277], "Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to 
the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the 
evaluation of absolute magnitudes." The evaluation of 
change is dependent on the reference point (initial 
position), which is typically status quo.^ Prospect theory.
^This refers to the "context effect" or framing.
^The reference point can also be an adaptation level, 
expected future wealth position, or targeted return level 
[Fishburn, 1977; Payne et al., 1980].
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
58
then, assumes the value function for changes to be concave
above the reference point, but convex below (see Figure
2.8). In other words, "the marginal value of both gains and
losses generally decreases with their magnitude [K&T,
p.278]." However, based on attitudes regarding changes in
wealth, the value function reflects the notion that the
pleasure of gaining an amount of money is not as great as
the displeasure of losing the same amount. Thus, the S-
shaped value function of Figure 2.8 depicts the "reflection
effect" which implies risk aversion in potential gain
situations and risk seeking in potential loss situations.
Decision Weights. Prospect theory requires that the
value of each outcome be multiplied by a decision weight.
Thus, it is important to understand the nature of decision
weights, as introduced by Fellner [1961]. They are not
simply the perceived likelihood of events, rather they are
measures of the affect events have on the desirability of
the outcome. It is important to understand that decision
weights do not measure degree or belief, nor do they follow
the axioms of probability. However, decision weights can be
related to probabilities. Identified properties are
illustrated in Figure 2.9 and are listed below:®
1. "d" (subjective decision weight associated with the
probability) is an increasing function of "p" 
(probability of prospect occurring) with d(0) = 0 and 
d(l) =1; impossible events are ignored and the
®See Sanders [1986, pp. 35-36] and Kahneman and Tversky 
[1979].
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FIGURE 2.9 
Weighting Function of Prospect Theory
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normalized scale reflects unity for certain events. 
Individuals' difficulty in cognisizing extreme 
probabilities results in highly unlikely events being 
edited as impossible outcomes and extremely likely 
events being edited as certain outcomes. Such editing 
produces discontinuities of "d" toward the endpoints of 
the 0 to 1 interval.
2. Decision makers tend to overweight low 
probabilities, (d(p)>p), while tending to underweight 
moderate to high probabilities, (d(p)<p).
3. The sum of complementary decision weights is less 
than one [d(p)+d(p-l)<l for 0<p<l] due to the 
underweighting effect being more pronounced than the 
overweighting. Because of this "subcertainty effect," 
preferences are generally less sensitive to probability 
variations than the expectation principle would 
suggest.
4. A "subadditivity effect" occurs only for small 
probabilities, and low probabilities are not accurately 
differentiated. The decision maker assigns decision 
weights, which diminish the comparative differences 
between probabilities, to low probabilities. Then, the 
decision makers will emphasize the comparative 
magnitudes of the outcomes [d(rp)>rd(p) for 0<r<l].
5. For a fixed probability ratio, the ratio of the 
associated decision weights "d" are closer to one when 
the probabilities are low than when they are high 
[d(pq)/d(p)<d(pqr)/d(pr) for 0<p,q,r<l]. For example, 
the ratio of "d" in d(.l)/d(.3) is closer to one than 
the ratio of "d" in d(.3)/d(.9). This "subpro­
portionality" effect holds only if the log of "d" is a 
convex function of the log of "p".
6. In 1953, Allais first introduced the "certainty 
effect," where outcomes that are certain loom larger 
than those which are merely probable. That is, 
certainty prospects are overweighted relative to 
probable ones. Reducing the probabilities of a 
prospect by a constant factor will have more impact on 
the preference ordering when the outcomes are initially 
certain than when they are merely probable.
7. The slope of "d" can be interpreted as measuring 
the sensitivity of preference to changes in 
probabilities.
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TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN
In their 1986 publication, Tversky & Kahneman (T&K)
explicitly address four of the major assumptions of expected
utility theory and illustrate that decision makers
frequently violate the assumptions. As a result of their
research, T&K conclude that normative and descriptive
analyses of decision making cannot be reconciled.
T&K address the assumptions of cancellation,
transitivity, dominance, and invariance. The assumption of
cancellation, which is widely challenged, is required to
represent preferences between prospects as the maximization
of expected utility. According to T&K [p. S252]:
The main argument for cancellation is that only one 
state will actually be realized, which makes it 
reasonable to evaluate the outcomes of options 
separately for each state. The choice between options 
should therefore depend only on states in which they 
yield different outcomes.
T&K find the empirical validity of this assumption to be
dependent on framing.
The assumption of transitivity, mentioned earlier, is
satisfied if each option can be assigned a value which is
independent of other available options. Again, framing has
been found to affect this assumption. T&K see dominance as
one of the more obvious principles of rational choice.
Dominance requires that the preferred option be the one
which is at least as good as all other options in all states
and better than all options in one state. Invariance is the
fourth assumption, and has been widely accepted for its
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normative appeal. This assumption requires that the
preference between options is not dependent on their
descriptions. Their observations suggest that people do not
" . . .  spontaneously aggregate concurrent prospects or
transform all outcomes into a common frame," and thus
violate the assumption of invariance. T&K [p.S254] state
that "Because invariance and dominance are normatively
essential and descriptively invalid, a theory of rational
decision behavior cannot provide an adequate description of
choice behavior." Another point of difference between
expected utility and prospect theory is found in T&K's
discussion of the effects of framing outcomes. They have
found that people are more sensitive to changes in wealth
(prospect theory's preferences for gains and losses) than
states of wealth (as implied by expected utility theory).
That is, people tend to have a risk-averse preference for
equal states of wealth framed as gains and risk-seeking
preference for equal states of wealth framed as losses. A
potentially significant implication of this finding for the
current study is the following [p. S261]:
. . .  a difference that favors outcome A over outcome B 
can sometimes be framed either as an advantage of A or 
as a disadvantage of B by suggesting either B or A as 
the neutral reference point. Because of loss aversion, 
the difference will loom larger when A is neutral and 
B-A is evaluated as a loss than when B is neutral and 
A-B is evaluated as a gain. The significance of such 
variations of framing has been noted in several 
contexts. . . Framing the consequences of a public 
policy in positive or in negative terms can greatly 
alter its appeal.
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T&K present one of the major findings of their study to 
be that people tend to violate the axioms of rational choice 
when the situations are nontransparent. Furthermore, they 
conclude the normative analysis of choice should be separate 
from the descriptive.
Readers familiar with budgeting literature in public 
administration and political science might also be familiar 
with the incremental theory of budgeting.? Incrementalism, 
much like prospect theory, resulted from recognition of 
weaknesses associated with rational decision makers. It is 
important to note that the use of prospect theory in this 
work is not considered a competing theory in the explanation 
of budgetary decision making. Rather, it is believed that, 
if combined, the theories might provide a more complete 
explanation. Future research should address such a combined 
approach.
Research Emplovina Prospect Theory
Since Kahneman and Tversky first introduced their 
concepts of prospect theory in 1979, several research 
efforts have been conducted which lend support to this 
theory of decision making behavior under uncertainty. A few 
of the more recent of such works are briefly discussed 
below.
?See Wildavsky [1964 & 1979] for more detail regarding 
the incremental theories of the budgetary process.
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KNOX
Knox [1987] compared the capabilities of the prospect 
theory model and the expected utility theory model in 
accommodating observed behavior of decision making under 
uncertainty. She employed two scenarios of uncertainty —  
illegal returns and plea bargaining —  using 70 convicted 
criminals as subjects. She found prospect theory to provide 
a more appropriate model of decision making under 
uncertainty than expected utility theory. Knox shows the 
appropriateness of prospect theory to stem from the theory's 
allowing probabilities to be transformed.
PUTO
Puto [1985] modelled the reference point of industrial 
buyers. He used 372 industrial buyers in a controlled 
experiment, and found that industrial buyers' choices 
conform to patterns predicted by prospect theory. A higher 
proportion of subjects who framed choices as gains preferred 
the riskless alternative over the gamble than did subjects 
who framed choices as losses. Based on his findings, Puto 
suggests methods of increasing effectiveness of marketing 
managers' sales and marketing communication efforts.
CHANG
Chang [1984] investigated the taxpayer's inclination to 
play the tax audit lottery, assuming the decision to be a 
choice problem under uncertainty. The experiment used 81
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students enrolled in an executive MBA program, and found the 
prospect theory model to be descriptive of the subjects' 
choices under uncertainty in the tax audit setting. As 
predicted by prospect theory, underwithheld taxpayers were 
more inclined to play the lottery than overwithheld 
taxpayers and taxpayers were very sensitive to changes in 
the probability of successful avoidance.
SANDERS
Sanders [1986] used tax practitioners from a national 
CPA firm to test four specific hypotheses based on prospect 
theory;
(1) Subjects' decision choices will differ for 
decisions framed as gains from those framed as 
losses;
(2) Reducing the probability of a certain and probable 
prospect by a constant factor will affect 
subjects' decision choices;
(3) Subjects' decision choices will be similar for 
individual and concurrent decisions; and
(4) A concurrent and a combined decision frame will 
evoke different decision choices.
The task involved reviewing two scenarios of tax issues
affecting the "client's" current tax return, and suggesting
to the client an appropriate tax treatment for each of the
issues. Sanders found support for the choice preferences
for gains versus losses and found that responses differed,
as expected, for scenarios framed with certainty rather than
probability. However, Sanders did not find support that
individuals are risk averse in gain situations and risk
seeking in loss situations. This may suggest the need to
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present framed scenarios in a way that puts the decision 
maker at risk more directly in order to more effectively 
test this assumption of prospect theory.
CROSBY, MOSKOWITZ, AND MAHESH
This study appears to have a finding similar to one 
found by Sanders [1986], above. Crosby et al. [1986], used 
14 practicing auditors (7 seniors and 7 partners) from seven 
Big-8 firms in their examination of the degree of individual 
differences in auditor behavior as suggested by differences 
in utility functions. The auditors were asked to act in 
their capacity as auditors rather than their capacity as 
individuals managing their own personal funds. The task 
involved stating the dollar amount of a certain sum which 
would leave the auditor indifferent between a 50-50 gamble 
and their stated certainty amount. The study does not 
indicate whether the scenarios relate to client-related 
uncertainty or audit firm-related uncertainty issues.
Crosby et al., did find all subjects to show a significant 
shift in risk behavior over the entire region of the 
function. Most of the subjects were risk averse above their 
target (or reference) point and risk seeking below.
However, seniors were found to be less risk-averse to losses 
than partners. As with Sanders [1986], this may be due to 
the nature of the task and the subjects' role or 
relationship to the scenarios employed.
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FIEGENBAUM AND THOMAS
Fiegenbaum and Thomas [1988] appear to be one of the 
first to apply the concepts of prospect theory at the 
organizational level. Their study developed a research 
methodology to determine whether prospect theory's concepts 
regarding individuals' risk attitudes provide explanations 
of risk behavior at the firm level. The study used U. S. 
industrial firms from COMPUSTAT from the period 1960 through 
1979. Each firm's average performance level was used as a 
proxy for its reference point in the analysis of 
relationships between risk and return both across firms and 
within industries. The study found strong support for the 
assumptions of prospect theory when applied at the 
organizational level. Findings suggest "that most firms may 
be risk seeking when they are suffering losses or are below 
targeted aspiration levels (their reference point). 
Conversely, they will tend to be risk averse following 
achievement of aspirations and targets [p. 97]."
LEVIN, JOHNSON, DELDIN, CARSTENS,
CRESSY, AND DAVIS
This study focused on two issues. First, Levin et al. 
[1986] were concerned with isolating the locus of the 
framing effect. Second, they were interested in analyzing 
framing effects under complete and incomplete information 
for evidence of predictive ability regarding discrete
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choices. The subjects'® behavior supported the basic
assumptions of prospect theory. In addition, subjects in a
positive condition were more risk averse than subjects in a
negative condition when the gamble was missing probability
information. As stated by Levin et al. [p.63]:
A parsimonious interpretation of the complete set of 
results of this study . . .  is that information frame 
affects the relative scale values associated with the 
likelihood of winning and losing . . .  as shown in the 
present study, the occurrence of framing effects when 
probability information is alternatively expressed in 
positive or negative terms can cause reversals of 
preference between alternatives with complete and 
incomplete information.
NORTHCRAFT AND NEALE
Northcraft and Neale [1986] used twenty undergraduate 
business students assuming the role of investment advisors 
in their analysis of the role of opportunity costs in 
resource allocation decisions. Their scenarios focused on 
the issue of long-term resource allocation decisions meeting 
with a setback which may lead to unanticipated unfavorable 
long-term outcomes. Northcraft and Neale found support for 
prospect theory's descriptions of decision behavior when 
framing options as gains and losses. They also found that 
inclusion of opportunity cost in the decision frames changes 
the total gains and losses evaluated by the decision maker
®The study does not identify its subjects. It is 
assumed that the study employed undergraduate psychology 
students.
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and changes the preference. Each of their research 
hypotheses were confirmed:
(1) opportunity costs were less likely than out-of- 
pocket costs to be considered in deciding whether 
to abandon or continue a project experiencing a 
setback;
(2) by heightening the salience of opportunity costs, 
persistence was viewed more negative an option and 
abandonment more positive an option; and
(3) by heightening the salience of opportunity costs, 
there was a decrease in persistence in light of a 
major setback.
BAZERMAN
In 1984, Bazerman applied Kahneman and Tversky's 
concepts of framing to an organizational behavior setting.
He used framing to address three specific issues: (1)
literature on the escalation of commitment to a previous 
course of action; (2) concessionary behavior by negotiators; 
and (3) the risky shift paradigm. Bazerman argues that 
currently accepted views on these issues must be 
reconsidered. More specifically, he concludes:
(1) The frame used influences decision makers and its 
impact must be separated from the impact of the 
escalation paradigm's objective state;
(2) The paradoxical state of arbitration being a risk- 
seeking alternative yet increasingly being 
employed by risk-averse parties can be explained 
by considering the positive (or at least neutral) 
framing behavior of successful negotiators; and
(3) The Choice Dilemma Questionnaire used to 
operationalize risk in risky shift research was 
generally positively framed, leading to an entire
. body of biased research.
Bazerman believes that prospect theory is relevant to 
even the most powerful of organizational behavior theories 
as well as to an increased understanding of applied
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managerial problems. In conclusion, he makes an important 
observation concerning the fact that decision makers must 
often frame the problems they face within their environment 
because many actual problems are not already framed as 
completely negative or positive.
BAZERMAN, MAGLIOZZI, AND NEALE
This 1985 study focused on the implications of prospect
theory in integrative bargaining and the free-market. Using
Tversky and Kahneman's explanation of how people respond
differently to questions framed as losses versus questions
framed as gains, Bazerman et al. analyzed the behavior of
178 graduate and undergraduate students randomly assigned to
either positively or negatively framed buyer or seller
roles. According to Bazerman et al. [p. 310]:
The results found that positively framed negotiators 
completed significantly more transactions than 
negatively framed negotiators. This result is 
consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory 
and contradicts the form of rationality suggested by 
the utility theory. That is, negotiators with the same 
objective information may compromise to very different 
degrees depending on the frame (gain versus loss) in 
which they view the transaction.
DECKER, SCHEPANSKI, AND SHIN
Decker et al. [1985] tested the prospect theory model, 
along with three other models, of the principals' 
information evaluation behavior in a private, pre-decision, 
principal-agency setting. The tests were "designed to 
disconfirm the models' predictions without assuming initial
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conditions [p. 430]." They found that the use of prospect 
theory can be extended from its information evaluator- 
decision maker setting to the principal-agency setting. 
Furthermore, they found support for the use of prospect 
theory over expected utility theory, based on their 
experimentation with 32 M.A. and Ph.D. students in 
accounting.
Summary of Chapter Two
This chapter has presented a review and summary of two 
general areas of research: governmental budgeting at the
local level and decision making behavior under uncertainty. 
Relevant theories and concepts of the governmental budgeting 
function were identified. In addition, the body of 
literature on local governmental units and their budgeting 
practices was discussed. Perhaps most importantly, the 
literature on small and rural governments was reviewed and 
the need for a greater understanding of that form of 
government was emphasized.
An area seemingly worthy of research in light of 
increasing public activism is the area of decision making 
behavior in the resource allocation process of small local 
governments. Because this is viewed as an issue of decision 
making under uncertainty, prospect theory is believed to be 
an appropriate approach to the study of such behavior. 
Chapter three explains the methodology employed in the 
extension of this literature.
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METHODOLOGY
The current administration of the United States 
government and many state governments have shifted much of 
their decision making authority and responsibility to the 
local governmental unit. In addition, the citizenry has 
become more active in monitoring governmental activity and 
pursuing specific causes for governmental action, especially 
at the local level. Thus, local government decision makers 
are forced to make more decisions and under the increasing 
scrutiny of their constituency.
Little is currently known about the resource allocation 
decision making behavior of local government decision makers 
(of any size).^ Without knowledge of the current status, a 
claim of the need for improvement may appear to be 
unfounded. Given the results of the little research that is 
available on larger local governments' budgeting behavior; 
however, it is difficult to accept the notion that smaller 
local governments' behavior does not warrant attention. It 
seems reasonable to expect even greater subjectivity and 
less sophistication to be present in the resource allocation 
decision making process of smaller local governments in
^As mentioned in chapter two, more research is 
available regarding local governments of greater than 
50,000. A few case studies have been published on smaller 
units. See chapter two for a literature review of this 
area.
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comparison with larger local governments.  ^ in this time of 
increasing attention to government action, these decision 
makers should be aware of their behavior and of the 
influences on that behavior. This is the focus of the 
proposed study.
As stated in the first two chapters, the objective of 
the study is to determine empirically whether the resource 
allocation decisions of managers (or appropriate officials) 
of small local governments are affected by altering the 
frame of the various resource allocation alternatives under 
consideration. If such an effect is found, awareness of the 
impact of framing may serve to improve resource allocation 
decisions through the development and incorporation of more 
comprehensive budget planning (and perhaps approval) 
systems. The objectives of this chapter are to identify 
specific decision making behaviors deserving of 
investigation at the small local government level and to 
discuss the design and implementation of the appropriate 
methodology for use in the investigation of these behaviors. 
The chapter is composed of the following sections; (1) 
statement of the research question and hypotheses, (2) case 
development, (3) justification of the research strategy, (4) 
explanation of the experimental variables, (5) discussion of 
the statistical analyses to be employed, (6) a description
2Authorities on small governments have suggested 
numerous reasons for the difference in behavior. See 
Honadle [1983] for a review of the literature.
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of the pilot study, and (7) brief svunmary of the study and 
expected results.
General Research Question
Many violations of rational decision theory (expected 
utility theory) have been identified in the decision making 
under uncertainty literature, and over the last decade 
research has found support for the explanations of such 
violations proposed by prospect theory. Prospect theory has 
been presented as descriptive of the process of evaluating 
risky prospects. It is based on the idea that preferences 
are dependent on the formulation of the decision problem, 
with the problem formulation being at least partially 
dependent on the decision maker's perspective or frame of 
reference. Because of the nonlinearity of the value weights 
and decision weights^ associated with risky prospects, 
preferences among choices are dependent on the decision's 
context. If the weights were linear, the context would not 
affect the preference order among risky prospects.
In contrast to expected utility theory, prospect theory 
assumes nonlinearity to exist and decision problems to be 
affected by altering the decision frames in terms of acts, 
outcomes, or contingencies. This proposed study will focus 
on the latter two, and their effects on rational choice. 
Decision acts can be framed in numerous ways which affect
^See Figures 8 and 9 of chapter 2.
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the desirability among alternatives of the decision problem. 
For example, decision acts may be framed as judgments or as 
choices, and as sets of either concurrent or independent 
decisions. Research has shown subjects tend not to 
integrate choices even when monetarily rewarded for 
integrating [Tversky and Kahneman, 1982]. Thus, by framing 
acts as choices to be integrated rather than as 
preintegrated choices, the presenter of information (or 
context) can affect decision behavior. Similarly, framing 
of decision problems in terms of their outcomes is expected 
to affect preferences among alternatives.
Prospect theory sees decision makers as evaluating 
outcomes (alternatives) not in terms of ultimate positions 
of wealth, but as changes in wealth from a neutral reference 
point. Thus, by presenting a reference point along with the 
decision problem, the alternatives will be evaluated as 
possible gains or losses from that point. By changing the 
reference point, preferences among alternatives may be 
affected even when the alternatives are identical with 
regard to ultimate positions of wealth (or welfare). That 
is, the value differences among prospects can be changed by 
manipulating the reference point. This aspect of prospect 
theory is most closely related to the S-shaped value 
function^ and the reflection effect discussed in chapter 
two. With regard to the framing of contingencies, the
 ^See Figure 8 of chapter 2.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
76
nonlinearity of the decision weights^, again, affects the
preference order of decision alternatives. Tversky and
Kahneman [1981] have found changes from impossible to
probable and from probable to certain to have greater
effects on decision preferences than similar changes in
probability which do not include the endpoints of
impossibility and certainty.
The framing of outcomes and contingencies effects are
to be tested by the current study and are discussed below,
following the statement of hypotheses. The general research
question may be stated as follows;
Do budgeting managers of small local governments tend 
to violate rational choice theory as a result of the 
framing of the resource allocation problem?
The two previous chapters identified consistency and
coherence as requirements for rationality. Thus, the
research question may be stated more precisely as:
Do budgeting managers of small local governments tend 
to respond inconsistently or incoherently to 
objectively identical resource allocation problems 
framed differently?
Statement of Hvootheses 
The general research question stated above may be 
translated into three statistically testable hypotheses.
The hypotheses are stated in their null forms, and a 
discussion of their expected results or alternative forms
 ^See Figure 9 of chapter 2.
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will follow. The hypotheses to be evaluated in this
research are;
HI: subjects will not alter their decision
preferences among different frames of the same 
contingency in a resource allocation problem.
H2: subjects will not alter their decision
preferences between different frames of the same 
outcome of a resource allocation problem.
H3: subjects will choose the alternative which
maximizes expected utility.
EXPECTED RESULTS OF HI
Prospect theory expects decision makers to change 
preferences among alternatives as a result of a change in 
the decision maker's point of reference regarding the 
contingency present in a decision problem. Thus, by 
altering the frame of the resource allocation problem's 
contingency this study should find that budget managers of 
small local governments do violate rational decision theory.
In order to more fully explain the expectations 
regarding this first hypothesis, the subjects' expected 
decision behavior for three cases will be discussed. Figure 
3.1 lists the proposed cases to be employed in this 
research, and these cases are referred to in the following 
explanation of expected decision behavior.&
Cases 1, 2 and 3 relate to the first hypothesis. The 
responses to these three cases must be considered jointly in
® An explanation of case development and selection is 
addressed in the following section of this chapter.
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the analysis of rational behavior. Cases 2 and 3 are 
identical as to probabilities and outcomes. Thus, 
consistency requires the same choice be made for the two 
cases. Furthermore, expected utility requires a preference 
for choices B (case 2) and Z (case 3). Assuming rational 
decision makers, the frequencies for these choices should be 
100%. T&K have found that in case 2 subjects favor a sure 
win (assuming the second level of the problem was reached, 
which makes case 2 identical to case 1), even though the 
expected utility was lower than the less certain 
alternative. The comparison of responses to cases 1, 2, and 
3 serves as a test of the "isolation effect." Subjects' 
responses should be identical for cases 2 and 3, unless 
subjects tend to isolate the two stages in case 2, 
responding to the probabilities of stage 2 only. In such a 
case, the responses to case 1 and case 2 should be 
identical. Case 1 has been used in prior research to 
emphasize the tendency for subjects to select the certain 
alternative (demonstrate the "certainty effect") rather than 
the alternative with the highest expected utility. The 
expected utility response frequencies for case 1 are 0% A 
and 100% B. The violations of expected utility theory 
described above are expected to be evidenced in the decision 
responses of the subjects of this proposed study.
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EXPECTED RESULTS OF H2.
Cases 4 and 5 (Figure 3.1) are representative of the 
cases used to investigate and explain violations of expected 
utility theory caused by alternative framings of objectively 
identical outcomes for a decision problem. These cases have 
identical expected values, that is, each alternative 
represents 20 jobs kept and 40 jobs lost. Expected utility 
theory would expect the response frequencies to be 50%-50% 
between the two plans of case 4 as well as for case 5. 
However, according to Tversky and Kahneman's work with 
similarly structured cases [K&T, 1979; T&K 1981], subjects 
are expected to prefer Plan A of case 4 and Plan D of case
5. These expectations are based on prospect theory's 
assertions that decision makers are risk averse when 
evaluating among gain alternatives (as in case 4 as a result 
of the "saving" of jobs approach) and risk seeking when 
evaluating among loss alternatives (as in case 5 as a result 
of the "loss" of jobs approach). Alternatives for cases 4 
and 5 all follow the same scenario of projected loss of 
government employees' positions; however, the two different 
approaches to wording the alternatives are expected to lead 
to different decision behavior.
EXPECTED RESULTS OF H3.
Cases 1 through 5 will be used to test the third 
hypothesis. The expected results regarding H3 have been
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indirectly presented through the explanation of the expected 
results of hypotheses 1 and 2. The certainty, isolation.
FIGURE 3.1 
Cases of Framing Alternatives
FRAMING OF CONTINGENCIES
Case 1: Which of the following options do you prefer?
A. a sure receipt of $150,000 in federal funding for 
capital improvements
B. 80% chance of receiving $200,000 in federal 
funding for capital improvements
Case 2: Without the expertise of a federal aid coordinator,
you feel it is extremely unlikely that your government will 
secure any federal funding. Thus, your government has begun 
negotiations to hire a federal aid coordinator in efforts to 
improve your chances of obtaining federal funding for 
capital improvements and special programs. You know that 
the applicants for the coordinator position are also 
negotiating with other governmental units, and you estimate 
that you have a 25% chance of hiring one of the applicants. 
If you hire one of the specialists you feel absolutely 
confident that the coordinator can secure $150,000 for 
capital improvements by focusing all energies on a specific 
strategy, and you are 80% confident that the coordinator can 
secure $200,000 by pursuing an alternative strategy. 
Preliminary paperwork must be submitted for approval by the 
council before the hiring process is expected to be 
completed. Which one of the coordinator strategies would 
you choose to present to the council?
A; ($150,000) or B: ($200,000, .80)
Case 3: Your government's federal aid coordinator has two
strategic options available for the current period's 
consideration. Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting in 
federal aid of $200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance of 
resulting in federal aid of $150,000. Which option would 
you encourage the coordinator to pursue:
Z: ($200,000, .2) or Y: ($150,000, .25)
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(Figure 3.1, continued)
FRAMING OF OUTCOMES
Based on their research indicating a trend in decreasing 
federal aid and an increasing demand for total governmental 
expenditures, your budget office projects the need to layoff 
60 government employees. However, two plans to alleviate 
this need for layoffs were submitted along with the budget 
staff's projection. Which plan would you favor? [This will 
be accompanied by either case 4 or case 5].
Case 4‘: Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all 
employees from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of 
saving none of the employees from the layoff.
Case 5: Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government 
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability 
that 60 government employee jobs will be lost.
and reflection effects are all expected to contribute toward 
the rejection of H3. Because of the alternative 
presentations of objectively identical information, subjects 
are not expected to consistently choose the alternative of 
higher expected value.
Case Development 
As seen in Figure 3.1, this study will employ five 
cases. This section describes the rationale for inclusion 
of these particular cases. Topic selection and case design 
are described below.
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TOPIC SELECTION.
During the literature review process, several issues 
regarding local government activity were identified.
Resource allocation activities (e.g., capital budgeting) 
which appeared to rely on a decision making under 
uncertainty process were collected and considered for 
incorporation into this study. Of the issues collected, 
those seemingly applicable across the population of small 
local governments were given further consideration. For 
example, it is highly likely that all local governments 
within this study's population must consider issues of 
pollution control and water treatment. Thus, these issues 
were given additional consideration for inclusion in the 
study.
Issues dropped from further consideration were those 
which seemed to rely on decision making under uncertainty, 
but which did not seem likely to relate to the entire 
population of small governments. For example, while the 
allocation of resources to the development of recreational 
facilities is a decision making under uncertainty issue, 
many very small local governments may not have the luxury of 
considering the issue at all. Thus, the recreational 
facilities issue was dropped from further case 
consideration.
Two fundamental issues were chosen for incorporation 
into the experimental cases. The issues are discussed below
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with reference to the related hypotheses and cases. 
Hypothesis 3 will be tested with all five cases. Therefore, 
the discussion of selected case topics for HI and H2 each 
apply to H3 as well.
Hypothesis 1 will be tested with the first three cases 
of Figure 3.1, which represent a gain contingency inasmuch 
as they refer only to possible inflows of resources. The 
issue addressed in these cases is federal funding for 
capital improvements. Capital budgeting is included among 
the fundamental issues confronting governmental decision 
makers of any size of governmental unit. Thus, subjects are 
expected to be familiar with the issue and the issue is 
expected to be relevant to all subjects. Because of the 
expected diversity among the subjects, the capital 
improvements issue is left in a generic form rather than 
more specific types and degrees of capital improvements.
This approach is believed to present the cases in a form to 
which all subjects can relate. The incorporation of a 
federal aid coordinator is believed to be applicable across 
the population inasmuch as small governmental units can 
obtain the services of a circuit-riding federal aid 
coordinator (or perhaps consulting services from a local 
university, etc.) or hire a permanent coordinator. Whether 
part-time or full-time help is obtained, professional help 
is considered to be necessary in negotiating with the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
84
federal government in light of the trend of decreasing 
amounts of federal funding to the local level of government.
Hypothesis 2 will be tested with cases 4 and 5 of 
Figure 3.1. Subjects will receive only one of these two 
cases. Similar to the topic of cases 1 through 3, the topic 
of cases 4 and 5 are expected to be highly relevant to the 
population being studied. Issues of employment are of 
concern to most of America on an aggregate or nationwide 
level but concern seems to grow stronger as the employment 
issues strike at the local level (i.e., "closer to home"). 
Moreover, those persons responsible for the budgeting 
process confront the issue repeatedly, whether in a line- 
item budget as wages and salaries are reviewed or in some 
other approach to budget preparation. The question of 
sufficient manpower is fundamental to any organization. The 
census will be a source of information for incorporating 
meaningful numbers into the cases, for example, regarding 
the size of the governmental labor force and federal capital 
improvements dollars received for units within the 
population of study.
CASE DESIGN
The study consists of two sets of cases (cases 1-3 & 
cases 4-5). Each set is designed to be a test of different 
implications of framing. The first three cases are designed 
to detect the isolation effect, the certainty effect and the 
pseudo-certainty effect. Case 1 is a test of the certainty
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effect. Prospect theory suggests that subjects will select 
the risk averse alternative when alternatives are framed as 
gains from their reference point, as in case 1. The case is 
designed so that the option of certainty is not the option 
of higher expected value. If expected utility theory holds 
true, subjects should prefer the $10,000 higher expected 
value of option B.
Case 2 is designed to test the isolation and pseudo­
certainty effects. Subjects who choose option A over option 
B are assumed to isolate stage 1 (hiring a coordinator) from 
stage 2 (choosing an option or strategy) of the decision 
problem. They do not perceive two risky prospects resulting 
from the conditions of the first stage. Subjects who 
isolate these stages are expected to select the option they 
consider to be a certainty (option A) even though option B 
has a higher expected value. Isolation of the stages 
results in cases 1 and 2 being identical as to probabilities 
and outcomes. However, if the subjects integrate stages 1 
and 2 of case 2, the probabilities and outcomes are 
identical to those of case 3. The interrelated structure of 
the three cases was designed to detect violations of the two 
accepted characteristics of rational decision behavior —  
coherence and consistency.
Cases 4 and 5, focusing on government layoffs, are 
designed to test the reflection effect and the certainty 
effect. That is, the framing of objectively identical
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alternatives as gains in case 4 and as losses in case 5 
should result in different behavior. Subj ects are expected 
to apply different value weights in evaluating options on 
the gain side of their reference point than when evaluating 
objectively identical options on the loss side of their 
reference point. The cases were designed to include an 
option of sure gain in case 4 and of sure loss in case 5, 
which will aid in detecting the presence of a certainty 
effect. If expected utility theory holds, subjects should 
be indifferent among the four options (A through D) and 
subject preferences should be evenly distributed among the 
options. However, if the reflection and certainty effects 
hold, (1) subjects should prefer the certain gain of case 4, 
which suggests risk averse behavior in light of gains; and 
(2) subjects should prefer the gamble of case 5, which 
suggests risk seeking behavior in light of losses.
Justification of the Research Strateav 
The research strategy proposed for this study is a 
quasi-field experiment.? This strategy is proposed as an 
attempt to maximize both internal and external validity to 
the extent possible.® Several threats to both internal and 
external validity will not be controlled for, however, due
?See Stone [1978, pp. 124-128] for a discussion of the 
field experiment.
®See Campbell and Stanley [1963] for a discussion of 
the concepts of internal and external validity.
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to the necessary trade off of controls over one type of 
validity for controls over the other. For example, external 
validity is increased by securing responses from actual 
managers or budget officials rather than using some 
surrogate subject group. However, the survey approach 
necessary to obtain a sufficient number of responses 
representative of the population of small local governmental 
units forces the experimenter to relinquish some of the 
control over internal validity available in a true lab 
experiment. Given the lack of information available on the 
target population for this study as well as the costs and 
time required for a more controlled approach, the survey 
approach seems justified. Furthermore, use of a pilot study 
(see the penultimate section of this chapter) and 
consultation with a city manager regarding the case scenario 
mundane and experimental realism, should reduce many threats 
to the validity of the study.
A review of Figure 3.1 might lead one to another 
limitation in the ability of this study to explain decision 
making behavior of the subjects. First, cases 1 through 3 
form a set of decisions providing insight with regard to 
gain contingencies only. Different behaviors may be 
associated with a similar set of decisions framed as loss 
contingencies. Investigation of this question is not 
considered feasible for practical reasons. Adding another 
case to each instrument would likely reduce the response
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rate and possibly sensitize subjects to the objectives of 
the study. The alternative to lengthening the instrument 
would double the subjects required for the study.
Similarly, the scenario for cases 4 and 5 employed a loss 
outcome (projected 60 employees laid off) and framed 
alternatives as gains (case 4) or losses (case 5). 
Differences in decision behavior might have been noted had 
the scenario employed a gain outcome (e.g., jobs created) 
and framed alternatives as gains or losses.9 These framing 
limitations are left to be addressed as an extension of the 
current study.
Explanation of the Experimental Variables
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable is the manager's choice or 
preference of outcomes and contingencies related to the 
decision problem. This variable is dichotomous for each of 
the decision cases used in the study (see Figure 3.1).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
There are two independent variables of framing included 
in this study: (l) framing of contingencies, and (2)
framing of outcomes. The first will be operationalized by 
employing the first three cases in Figure 3.1. Each subject
^Harwood, Pate, and Schneider [unpublished, 1988] have 
done some work in this area, however, no published cites are 
currently available.
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will be randomly assigned to one of the three cases. The 
second independent variable will be operationalized by 
employing cases 4 and 5 of Figure 3.1. Each subject will be 
randomly assigned to one of either case 4 or 5. Thus, each 
subject will be randomly assigned to two cases which 
operationalize the two independent variables (see Figure 
3.2). Following consultation with a city manager, the pilot 
study (described below) will investigate the effectiveness 
of the manipulation, or the impact of these independent 
variables on the dependent variable.
FIGURE 3.2
Versions of the Test Instrument
V E R S I 0 N
1 2 3 4 5 6
c 1 X X
A 2 X X
S 3 X X
E 4 X X X
S 5 X X X
Statistical Analvses 
Responses to the five cases will be evaluated in terms 
of the consistency and coherency requirements of rational 
choice theory, as discussed above. Each case elicits 
dichotomous responses which are mutually exclusive, and 
employs a nominal measurement scale. Therefore, a 
nonparametric test is appropriate. A binomial test may be 
used to draw inferences about the population proportion.
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The expected frequencies (hypothesized population 
proportions) will be based on the well-accepted expected 
utility theory.
Three assumptions must be addressed in order to justify 
use of the binomial test. The first assumption is that the 
data consist of the outcomes of n repeated Bernoulli trials 
(i.e., each outcome consists of either of two possible 
responses). The second assumption is that the n trials are 
independent. The third assumption is that the probabilities 
associated with the response categories remain constant from 
trial to trial. This assumption is dependent on expected 
utility theory and rational decision behavior. It is 
believed that the necessary assumptions will be reasonably 
satisfied by the current study, and the use of a binomial 
test may be deemed appropriate for the data analyses.
Given scenarios where the expected utility between 
alternatives is objectively identical, the Chi-square test 
will be used to test the null hypothesis that the sampled 
population responses do follow binomial distributions.10 If 
the null is true, the expected frequency can be computed as 
the product of the sample size and the corresponding 
category probability. Once the expected frequencies have
lOgee Levin [1984, p. 215] for a discussion of the 
criteria for classification as a binomial distribution and 
Daniel [1978, ch.8] for a discussion of the appropriate use 
of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test.
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been calculated, the Chi-square test statistic below can be 
used for each applicable scenario.
x2 = (Oj - 
Ei
The decision rule is to reject the null at the alpha 
significance level if where r is the number
of categories and g represents the number of parameters 
(expected frequency in this case) which must be estimated.
In the cases where uniform distribution is expected, no 
expected frequency calculation using sample data is 
necessary. Thus, the degrees of freedom would simply be 
r-1. The test statistic and decision rule will be identical 
to those for the binomial distribution situation [Daniel, 
1978, ch.8].
Pilot Study
As mentioned several times throughout this chapter, a 
pilot study will be administered as an aid in preparation of 
the survey instrument to be used in the study of local 
governmental decision makers' decision behavior. Officials 
of small local governments around the Baton Rouge area will 
be randomly assigned to one of the versions of the test 
instrument presented in Figure 3.2. They will be mailed a 
cover letter accompanied by a pre-addressed and stamped bi­
fold questionnaire (see Appendix A). They will be asked to 
consider and respond to two cases by assuming their role of 
budget manager for their small local government. In
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addition, they will be asked to answer several demographic 
questions which are planned to appear on the test instrument 
of the actual study. By administering the entire test 
instrument (including demographics), some awareness of the 
response rate should be obtained even though the 
demographics on the test instrument will not be relevant in 
the pilot study. Subjects of the pilot study will be asked 
to write any comments or constructive criticisms on a blank 
piece of paper. These experienced managers should provide 
valuable comments, particularly with regard to the 
reasonableness of the case scenario topics. Once all 
comments have been considered and the data collected from 
the pilot study has been analyzed, any noted weaknesses in 
the test instrument will be adjusted to the extent possible.
Summary
This chapter presented the methodology chosen for the 
analysis of local governmental decision making behavior in 
situations of uncertainty. Issues of reduced federal 
funding and governmental employee layoffs were presented as 
the uncertainty situations to be used in the assessment of 
rational decision making behavior. Although expected 
utility theory has been widely accepted as an explanation of 
decision making under uncertainty, elements of prospect 
theory, such as the reflection effect and the certainty 
effect, were explained as being potentially more 
descriptive of the subjects' decision making behavior.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND ANALYSES
The purpose of this chapter is to present and explain 
the results of the study described in the previous chapter. 
The chapter is divided into the following sections for 
discussion;
1. Review of the research methodology,
2. Review of the sampling procedure,
3. Demographics,
4. General case results,
5. Analyses of hypotheses,
6. Personal interviews,
7. Summary and conclusions.
Review of the Research Methodology
A quasi-field experiment was conducted and data was
collected by means of a mail survey. Six hundred
governmental units throughout the United States were
randomly selected to participate in this study. The study
examines the responses of the local governmental units'
budgeting managers for violations of rational choice.^ The
research proposition of interest is as follows:
Budgeting managers tend to respond inconsistently and 
incoherently to objectively identical resource 
allocation alternatives framed differently.
In order to investigate this proposition, three specific
research hypotheses were developed and tested.
^Recall from previous chapters that researchers have 
accepted consistent and coherent choice behavior as rational 
choice behavior, and expected utility theory as the 
predominant theory of decision making under uncertainty.
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The study measures a single dependent variable, which 
is the subject's preference among alternatives related to 
the decision problem confronting the subject. Subject 
responses to five cases were used to assess the concepts of 
consistency and coherency, which serve as measures of 
rational decision behavior. For each case employed, the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous decision choice.
The independent variables are the frames of the 
decision problems (or cases). A brief description of the 
five cases used in this study is presented in Table 4.1. 
Cases one through three are framed as a gain. The factor 
that is experimentally manipulated is the framing of 
contingencies (i.e., probabilities). The manipulation is 
operationalized by providing information in non­
preintegrated (case 2) or preintegrated (case 3) form. Case 
one serves, mainly, in the assessment of subjects' decision 
processing strategy, which aids in the interpretation of 
cases two and three.% Cases four and five assess the impact 
of the framing of outcomes by presenting objectively 
identical information in either a gain frame (case 4) or a 
loss frame (case 5). In both of these cases, the expected 
outcomes of the decision alternatives are identical. Of 
interest is the effect of varying the frame on subjects' 
preference for (or tolerance of) uncertainty.
^The interrelationships among cases one through three 
are discussed along with the survey's results in a later 
section of this chapter.
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Review of the Sampling Procedure 
Above, it was mentioned that 600 local governments were 
selected to participate in this study by responding to some 
of the cases listed in Table 4.1 as well as several 
demographic items. This section of chapter four reviews the 
sampling procedure employed in obtaining the list of 600 
governmental units surveyed.
TABLE 4.1 
CASE DESCRIPTION
Case Frame Tooic Alternatives
1 Gain Federal
Funding
1. Receive $150,000
2. 80% probability of 
receiving $200,000
2 Gain 
(not pre­
integrated)
Federal
Funding
1. 25% probability of 
opportunity to 
receive $150,000
2. 25% probability of 
opportunity for 
80% probability of 
receiving $200,000
3 Gain
(pre- ._ 
integrated)
Federal
Funding
1. 25% probability of 
receiving $150,000
2. 20% probability of 
receiving $200,000
4 Gain Status of 
60 jobs
1. Save 20 jobs
2. 1/3 probability of 
saving 60 jobs;
2/3 probability of 
saving no jobs.
5 Loss Status of 
60 jobs
1. Lose 40 jobs
2. 1/3 probability of 
losing no jobs;
2/3 probability of 
losing all jobs.
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The purpose of this study was to research the decision 
making behavior of the individuals responsible for the 
allocation of resources (budgeting) within small local 
governments. "Small" government is defined as local levels 
of government serving no more than 10,000 people. In the 
interest of external validity, a random sampling procedure 
was used. The Bureau of the Census publishes a directory of 
U.S. governmental units. The population of interest for 
this study was a subset of that directory. Governments 
serving 10,000 people or less were identified within the 
1987 directory of all active governmental units in the U.S. 
Then, a random number generator provided a list of 600 
numbers which were matched with the directory's observation 
numbers. The governments corresponding to the matching 
observation numbers were included in the sample.
SAMPLE SIZE
Fleiss [1981] provides a table identifying the sample 
sizes required per group for a two-tailed test on 
proportions, given anticipated proportions, alpha and power 
levels. Tversky and Kahneman's [1981 & K&T,1979] research 
findings were used as a priori proportions for each of the 
five cases. Also, for purposes of determining an adequate 
sample size for each case from Fleiss' table, the alpha and 
power levels were set at .05 and .8, respectively. Having 
set those criteria, the appropriate number of subjects 
required for analysis of particular cases is thirty-six
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subjects for comparison of cases two and three. Thus, the 
sample size is based on eighteen subjects per version of the 
survey (see Table 4.2). As can be seen in Table 4.2, each 
version contains two different cases. Because there was no 
response rate information available in the literature 
regarding surveys of local governmental units, the pilot 
study response rate of 20% was incorporated in the sample 
size calculation. Thus, it was believed that the necessary 
eighteen responses per version would be obtained by mailing 
one hundred surveys per version (or six hundred surveys).
TABLE 4.2
SURVEY VERSIONS AND REQUIRED RESPONSES
Case VI V2
Vers
V3
;ion
V4 V5 V6
Total subjects 
oer case
1 18 18 36
2 18 18 36
3 18 18 36
4 18 18 18 54
5 18 18 18 54
FIRST MAILING
Each subject received a one-page letter with two cases 
printed on the back and a self-addressed, postage-paid
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response form.^ The letter solicited subject participation 
and asked subjects to use the accompanying response form to 
indicate their preferences to the cases. Thus, only the 
response form was returned by the subjects. Because the 
subject mailing list was in alphabetical order by state, the 
six versions were assigned to the specific subjects by an 
orderly rotation of versions from the top to the bottom of 
the mailing list. That is, every sixth subject on the list 
received the same version of the survey and accompanying 
response form.
The first mailing consisted of six hundred surveys, 
mailed by first class mail. Of those six hundred survey 
packets, ten were returned as undeliverable and one response 
form was returned indicating that the subject was not a 
governmental unit. The majority of the undeliverable 
packets indicated that the subject (government) left no 
forwarding address. These units may have become inactive 
since the compilation of the directory. In addition, a few 
of the undeliverable packets were returned marked 
insufficient address. Because the surveys were mailed first 
class, it was assumed that the eleven returns were the only 
problems with the mailing. Thus, the eleven problem 
subjects were removed from the denominator for the response 
rate calculation. As a result of the first mailing, the
^See Appendix A for a copy of the letters and response
form.
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response rate was 32.1%, which exceeds the targeted response 
rate of 20%. Table 4.3 shews the number of responses per 
version for both the initial and follow up mailing.
SECOND MAILING
A second mailing was sent to those subjects who had not 
responded by the third week following the initial mailing. 
Each subject was mailed the same version in both mailings. 
Suprisingly, one of the survey packets was returned 
"undeliverable— attempted unknown" from the second mailing. 
Thus, although the use of first class mail provides greater 
assurance that all packets were received by the addressee 
government or returned to sender, there is no guarantee of 
receipt. As a result of the second mailing, the response 
rate increased to 47.4% (see Table 4.3). A chi-square 
comparison showed no significant difference in response 
rates among the versions.
TABLE 4.3 
NUMBER OF RESPONSES PER VERSION
V E R S I O N S
1 2 3 4 5 6
Target Response 18 18 18 18 18 18
First Mailing 34 29 33 34 37 22
Second Mailing 18 17 13 17 10 15
Combined 52 46 46 51 47 37
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Demographics
The survey instrument served to collect ten pieces of 
demographic information from each subject in the sample.
Five items focused on the individual, the governmental 
official, who responded to the survey. The other five items 
focused on the governmental unit with which the individual 
is associated. Table 4.4 summarizes all demographic 
information collected regarding the individual survey 
respondent. Similarly, Table 4.5 is devoted to the 
demographic information regarding the governmental unit 
represented by the individual survey respondent. The 
empirical evidence provided by this survey will help to 
support or refute statements regarding small governmental 
units which have been merely conjecture to date. The 
implications of these demographics are discussed in a later 
section of this chapter.
SURVEY RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS
As shown in Table 4.4, the five demographic items 
focusing on the individual can be grouped into three topic 
areas for discussion: (1) education, (2) governmental
experience, and (3) selection procedure for current 
position. Each of these areas are briefly discussed below.
Education. Completion of high school was the highest 
level of education achieved by 44% of the respondents. 
However, approximately 54% of the respondents earned at 
least a two-year (associates) college degree. Moreover,
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Education
Highest Degree Obtained: Number Percent-
High School 123 44. 1
Associates 33 11.8
Bachelors 71 25.4
Masters 47 16.8
Doctorate 1 .4
275 98.5
*Four subjects did not respond to this item.
Area of Study
(for highest degree) Number Percent-
General High School 123 44.1
Governmental 34 12.2
Business 46 16.5
Other 60 21.5
263 94.3
Sixteen subjects did not respond to this item.
Years
1
5
10
20
Y <
Y <
Y <
Y <
Y
Governmental Experience 
In
Budgeting 
Number Percent
1"
5
10
20
29
72
74
80
24
279
10.4 
25.8
26.5 
28.7
8.6
100
In Current 
Position 
Number Percent
41
100
60
61
17
279
14.7
35.8 
21.5
21.9 
6.1
100.0
Includes subjects who did not respond to this item.
Selection Procedure For Current Position
Number Percent 
Elected 116 42
Appointed 163 58
279 100
approximately 17% of the respondents earned advanced (post 
baccalaureate) degrees, including one doctorate.
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Most respondents who indicated attainment of degrees 
beyond high school also indicated the area of study in their 
college programs. Of that 54% of the survey respondents 
earning at least a two-year college degree, 24% indicated a 
program concentrating on some form of governmental 
administration, and 33% indicated a program which would 
appropriately be classified as a business program. The 
remaining respondents indicated a variety of education and 
science degrees.
Experience. Two demographic items focused on 
experience. One question asked respondents to indicate how 
many years of governmental budgeting experience they 
possess. The category of highest frequency was that for 
between 10 and 20 years of such budgeting experience, with 
approximately 29% of the respondents. The average number of 
years of budgeting experience for the survey respondents was
9.8 years. The second question regarding experience asked 
respondents to indicate how many years they have held their 
current position within their governmental unit. Table 4.4 
shows that approximately 36% of the respondents have held 
their positions for some period of time between one and five 
years. The average number of years of respondents' 
experience in their current position was 7.8 years. With 
regard to both the respondents' experience in their current 
position and their governmental budgeting experience, the 
lowest level of experience was associated with respondents
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who had been positioned just prior to the survey (0 years). 
The highest level of experience for both demographic items 
was thirty-seven years.
Selection. The fifth demographic item to be discussed 
asked respondents how they were selected to serve in their 
current position. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents 
indicated that they had been appointed rather than elected 
to their current position. Governmental budgeting 
literature suggests that appointees may behave differently 
from elected officials. Results from this demographic item 
will help to support or refute that notion, and are 
discussed in the hypotheses analysis section of this 
chapter.
GOVERNMENTAL UNIT DEMOGRAPHICS
Half of the demographic questions included within the 
survey instrument focused on the governmental unit 
represented by the respondent. Each of those five items is 
briefly discussed below and summarized in Table 4.5. These 
demographics were intended to contribute to the 
interpretation of case responses by providing some insight 
as to the actual characteristics of responding governmental 
units, which might have influenced the way that the 
respondent related to the case scenarios. In addition, this 
information contributes to a foundation for future research 
focusing on small governmental units.
Population. The instrument was intended to survey a
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TABLE 4.5 
GOVERNMENTAL UNIT DEMOGRAPHICS
(P)
Population
100
500
1000
3000
5000
7000
10000
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Population Size 
Number 
of Units 
2 
12 
28 
111 
62 
20 
35 
7
277
100
500
1000
3000
5000
7000
1000
Percent 
of Units 
0.7 
4.3
10.0
39.8 
22.2 
7.2 
12.5
2.5 
99.2
Two subjects did not indicate size.
Type of Government
Number Percent
 Type_____ of Units of Units
192 68.8
82 29.4
1 0.4
1 0.4
3 1.1
279 100.0
Municipality
Township
Village
County
Other
Number of Employees
(E)
Employees
E < 10 
10 < E < 50 
50 < E < 100 
100 < E
Number 
of Units 
121 
112 
36 
10 
279
Percent 
of Units 
43.4 
40.1
12.9 
3.6
100.0
Employs A Full-time Budget Officer
Budget Officer 
Yes 
No
Number 
of Units 
53 
226 
279
Percent 
of Units
19.0
81.0
100.0
1987 Federal Funding For Capital Improvements
(F)
Funds fOOOs)
F < 100 
100 < F < 400 
400 < F < 1000 
1000 < F
Number 
of Units 
28 
24 
11 
7 
70
Percent 
of Units
10.0 
8.6
3.9
2.5
25.0
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random sample of governmental units ranging in size from a 
population of less than one hundred people to approximately 
ten thousand people. Table 4.5 indicates that the sample 
surveyed was within the range of sizes intended. However, 
one of the respondent units had grown significantly from the 
time of the 1980 census count. Based on the 1980 census, 
the particular governmental unit had a population of no more 
than ten thousand people, but by the survey date the unit’s 
size had grown to approximately twenty-five thousand.
Because this unit was viewed as an outlier (and 
substantially outside this study's definition of small 
government), the unit was not included in the calculation of 
the average population size of governmental units 
responding. The average population for respondents meeting 
the definition of small government employeed by this study 
was 3,605 people. The largest and smallest population of 
responding units was 12,500 and thirty-five, respectively.
Type of Government. The survey asked respondents to 
indicate whether their unit fell into one of five specified 
categories or some other (nonspecified) category. 
Approximately 98% of the responding governmental units fell 
into just two categories of government type. Municipalities 
comprise 69% of all responding units. It is interesting to 
note that, based on the other demographics, there did not 
appear to be any pattern or rule for units earning any 
particular status (e.g., municipality versus township).
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Such status appears to be dictated by the state in which the 
governmental unit operates. Based on population, the data 
suggests no uniformity in classification of the subject 
units, taken as a whole. For example, all respondents 
located in Arizona, California and Texas indicated that 
their units are classified as municipalities, regardless of 
size. Respondents of many other states indicated a split 
between township and municipality status, which is 
apparently based on something other than population size. 
That is, either classification is used for units of any 
particular size.
Employees. Two demographic items addressed issues 
regarding the governmental units' employees. One item asks 
respondents to indicate the number of employees employed by 
the respondents' unit. Approximately 83% of the responding 
units employed no more than fifty employees. The average 
number of employees for all responding units was twenty- 
seven. The number of employees ranged from none to 206 
being employed by a single unit.
Upon review of the responses received, it is evident 
that this demographic item should be interpreted and used 
cautiously. It appears that some of the respondents 
considered part-time employees to be different from full­
time employees for the purpose of answering this survey 
item. Thus, respondents who did not identify the number of 
full- and part-time employees within their units might have
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responded with the total number of employees.
Alternatively, they might have responded just with the 
number of full-time employees. Elected and contracted 
positions did not appear to be viewed by any of the 
respondents as being positions of employment within the 
governmental units.
The second demographic item addressing the governmental 
units' employees is related to the amount of time and 
attention devoted to the units' budgeting process. Eighty- 
one percent of the respondents indicated that their unit 
does not employ a full-time budget officer. This finding is 
consistent with findings of case studies published to date.4 
Of the 19% of the units that do employ such an employee,
79% stated that their budget officers were appointed rather 
than elected. A comparison of responses to the question of 
whether or not the individual respondent was elected or 
appointed and the question of whether or not the budget 
officer was appointed or elected suggests that, in almost 
every instance where it was indicated that the unit employs 
a full-time budget officer, the respondent was the budget 
officer. Results of the comparison lend support to the 
belief that the subjects responding to the survey were the 
subjects intended.5
^For example, see Honadle [1983].
^Recall that the survey instrument was addressed to the 
subject governmental unit to the attention of the budget 
preparer.
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Funding. Current business and public administration 
literature suggests that state and local governments are 
receiving less support for capital improvements in the form 
of federal funds. For example, Hoffman, Mister and Strawser 
[1988, p. 105] state that such funding has decreased 19% 
over the period from 1960 to 1986.® Seventy-five percent of 
the respondents received no federal funds for capital 
improvements in 1987. Federal support averaged $432,807 for 
the 25% of the governmental units receiving funding in 1987. 
The lowest and highest funding amounts were $325 and 
$3,666,000, respectively, with a median of $115,000.
General Case Results 
The results of this study are analyzed from two 
perspectives. Because the objective of the study is to 
assess the decision making behavior of the subjects with 
regard to rationality, the study's null hypotheses are 
tested in terms of expected utility theory. However, 
prospect theory is also employed in the analysis. As 
discussed in chapter two, prospect theory offers 
explanations for deviations in decision making behavior from 
that predicted by expected utility theory. Thus, a
®The significance of this decrease in funding might be 
more clearly expressed, in constant dollar terms. The Office 
of Management and Budget [1983] used 1982 as the base year, 
to estimate that federal funding to state and local 
governments for capital improvements has decreased 
approximately $3,900,000,000 over the ten year period from 
1977 to 1987.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
109
combination of the two theories may be used to predict 
decision making behavior in light of the presentation of 
information to the decision maker. Before analyzing 
respondents' decisions in terms of the three hypotheses of 
this study, it is interesting to note the degree of 
similarity among (1) the respondents' choices in this study,
(2) the choices made by respondents of prior research, and
(3) the choices predicted by expected utility theory.
Choices were made between decision alternatives for each of 
five cases. Table 4.1 summarizes the five cases for 
reference throughout this chapter. As illustrated in Table 
4.2, each subject received only two cases (one version). 
Chi-square tests show that the subjects' preferences were 
not significantly influenced by the combination of cases 
(the particular version) confronting them. Similarly, there 
were no significant differences in results of the first 
mailing when compared to the results of the second mailing.
Table 4.6 shows that, for three of the five cases, 
respondents of the current study have response frequencies 
very similar to those of respondents of prior research. For 
each of the three cases (cases 1, 2, & 4), current and prior 
research vary greatly from expected utility frequencies. 
Similarly, response frequencies for case 3 of the current 
study differ from expected utility theory. However, the 
results of that case do not confirm prior research response 
frequencies. As will be discussed later in this chapter, it
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is interesting to note a greater divergence between expected 
utility theory and the current study's response frequencies 
than between expected utility theory and prior research with 
regard to case 3 responses. Case 5 of the current study 
also differs from prior research, but the response 
frequencies of the current study are very similar to those 
predicted by expected utility theory. Thus, four of the 
five cases differ from expected utility theory; three of the 
five cases confirm prior research as to deviations of 
response frequencies from expected utility theory; two of 
the five cases differ from prior research response 
frequencies, with the response frequencies of one of those 
two being very similar to that predicted by expected utility
TABLE 4.6
CASE RESULTS OF CURRENT STUDY (C) VERSUS 
PRIOR RESEARCH (?) * AND EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY (E)
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 CASE 5
A B A B Z Y A B C D
c 87%
n=:
13%
.00
76%
n=
24%
=89
43%
n=
57%
=82
79%
n=:
21%
.40
52%
n=:
48%
.29
p 80%
n=f
20%
35
78%
n=:
22%
L41
65%
n=
35%
=95
72%
n=]
28%
L52
22%
n=:
78%
.55
E 0% 100% 0% 100% 100% 0% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Prior research results taken from Tversky and Kahneman 
[1986] and Kahneman and Tversky [1979].
The table reflects percentages of case responses.
The sample size of each case is indicated by the 
notation, "n=," appearing below each set of percentages.
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theory. Again, implications of these similarities and 
differences are presented in the following sections of this 
chapter.
Survey Results and the Hypotheses 
Each of the three research hypotheses are discussed 
individually below. First, the purpose of each hypothesis 
as well as the expected results of the survey cases, with 
regard to each hypothesis, are presented. Then, actual 
survey results and analyses, in terms of both prior research 
and expected utility theory, follow.
HYPOTHESIS 1
HI: subjects will not alter their decision preferences
among different frames of the same contingency in a 
resource allocation problem.
The null form of hypothesis one is based on expected 
utility theory, and is tested using cases one, two, and 
three of the current study (see Table 4.1). The alternative 
hypothesis is based on prior research in prospect theory, 
and states that decision preferences will change direction 
among alternatives as a result of changing the reference 
point regarding the contingency present in a decision 
problem.
Case 1. Case one puts decision makers at the start of 
a single stage decision where they must choose between a 
sure gain and a probable gain of higher expected value 
($150,000 vs $160,000). Prospect theory expects risk averse 
behavior in a gain-framed situation, thus, decision makers
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are expected to prefer the sure $150,000 over the 80% 
probable $200,000. Kahneman and Tversky [1979] describe 
subjects as experiencing a "certainty effect" in their 
preference for a sure payoff of lower expected value over a 
probable payoff of greater expected value. Expected utility 
theory predicts that the decision maker choose the 
alternative with the higher expected value (i.e., $200,000 x 
80% = $160,000).
A chi-square test shows a significant difference 
between the respondents' preference and the expected utility 
preference (see Table 4.7). Eighty-seven percent of the 
subjects in the current study chose the sure gain over the 
risky gain of higher expected value. It is assumed that, 
all else being equal, subjects would prefer receiving more 
money than less. If subjects had focused on the dollar 
amounts, they would have compared $150,000 to $200,000, and 
chosen the latter. Results indicate that this was not done. 
Thus, subjects appear to have experienced the "certainty 
effect" by considering the probabilities, and violating 
expected utility theory.
Case 2. Case two presents a two-stage decision 
situation, and gives subjects a choice of placing 
themselves at the start of either one of the two stages 
(again, refer to Table 4.1 for case summaries). According 
to prospect theory [K&T, 1979], subjects view themselves at
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one or the other of the two stages depending on their 
decision processing strategy. If subjects are what Tversky
TABLE 4.7
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CASES ONE, TWO AND THREE 
BASED ON CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC
Comparison to Expected Utility Theory
Computed Significance
Case Chi-souare— Level
1 1415.58 .005
2 841.05 .005
3 375.71 .005
*These test statistics are conservative as 
a result of forcing the category of smaller 
expected frequency from a frequency of zero 
to a frequency of five (minimum expected 
frequency allowed for chi-square).
Comparison Between Current Study Cases 
Test Significance
Cases Statistic— Level
1-2 6.63 .010
2-3 14.88 .005
Comparison of Current Study to Prior Research—
Test. Significance
Case Statistic^ Level
1 3.06 .100
2 .06 **
3 7.04 .010
*Tversky & Kahneman [K&T, 1973 & T&K, 1331] 
results represent the expected frequencies for 
comparison tc those observed in current study.
** Not significant.
and Kahneman refer to as "standard formulation" information 
processors, the decision maker will consider themselves at
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the start of the first of two stages. These subjects will 
not perceive a certain option and a risky option in case 
two. Rather, both options will be viewed as only probable. 
Thus, they should choose the option of higher expected value 
((20% (or 25% X 80%) x $200,000) rather than the other 
option of (25% x $150,000)).
However, subjects may be what Tversky and Kahneman 
refer to as "sequential formulation" information processors. 
If so, the decision maker will consider themselves at the 
start of the second of the two stages. That is, they 
experience what Kahneman and Tversky [1979] refer to as the 
"isolation effect," isolating stage one from stage two of 
the decision problem. These subjects ignore the first 
stage, seeing it as necessary to both options of the second 
stage. Thus, as in case one, the decision makers are 
choosing between what is perceived as a certain $150,000 and 
a risky $200,000 ($160,000 expected value). Kahneman and 
Tversky [1979] refer to the perceived certainty as 
"pseudocertainty" inasmuch as there is no certain option for 
the decision problem as a whole.
Subjects of the current study appear to have processed 
the information in a sequential manner, ignoring the 25% 
chance of reaching the second stage of the two-stage 
problem. As mentioned above, ignoring the first stage leads 
the subjects to perceive one certain option and one risky 
option, which should lead to response frequencies similar to
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those of case one. Seventy-six percent of the subjects in 
the current study chose the option of $150,000 (expected 
value $37,500). Only 24% of the subjects chose the option 
of $200,000 (expected value $40,000). As Tabli 4.7 
indicates, there is a significant difference between 
respondents' preferences and that predicted by expected 
utility theory. As expected, this is consistent with the 
"certainty effect" found in case one.
A comparison of case one and case two shows a 
significant difference (at the .01 level) in subject 
preference between these cases in the current study (see 
Table 4.7). This difference may be explained by a dilution 
of the "pseudocertainty effect" of case two as a result of 
the case two respondent group being a combination of both 
sequential and standard type formulators. However, a review 
of Table 4.6 shows that, for both cases one and two, 
subjects' preferences for the certain alternative was 
significantly greater than their preference for the higher 
expected value alternative.
Case 3. Case three gives subjects the same information 
that was available in case two, but presents it in 
preintegrated form. That is, the subjects have no choice 
between sequential or standard formulation of information. 
Thus, subjects must choose between two risky alternatives 
and are expected to maximize their utility (i.e., neither 
certainty nor pseudocertainty is expected to be perceived).
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Forty-three percent of the subjects in the current 
study chose the option with a $40,000 (20% x $200,000) 
expected value, and 57% chose the option with a $37,500 (25% 
X 150,000) expected value. This is significantly different 
(at the .01 level) from the findings of prior research (see 
Table 4.7). If subjects behaved according to expected 
utility theory, they would have calculated the expected 
values of the two options and would have chosen the higher 
value option (i.e., the $40,000 option). Since subjects did 
not behave in total accordance with expected utility theory 
(see Table 4.7), they might have focused on the absolute 
dollar amounts or the probabilities associated with each 
option. A focus on the dollar amounts of the options would 
lead subjects to select the option with the higher absolute 
dollar amount (i.e., the $200,000 option). Again, subjects 
did not prefer that option. Thus, a significant number of 
subjects appear to have focused on the probabilities of the 
options and, accordingly, chose the option with the greatest 
probability of payoff (i.e., the 25% option). This 
interpretation implies that the dollar amounts ($150,000 
versus $200,000) were viewed as roughly equivalent.
The results of cases two and three in the current study 
are of further interest when their preferences are compared. 
By presenting the same contingency information to subjects 
in preintegrated (case three) or non-preintegrated (case 
two) form, subject preference between alternatives is
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altered. The results of case three are more in the 
direction of expected utility results than those of case two 
(see Table 4.6). However, this shift may have resulted from 
an inappropriate focus on the magnitude of the 
probabilities, rather than rational decision making.
Subject preferences in these two cases are significantly 
different (see Table 4.7). That is, subjects' preferences 
were altered by presenting contingency information in 
preintegrated versus non-preintegrated form.
Hvpothesis 1 Summary. The results of each case used to 
test hypothesis one refute expected utility theory and 
reject the null hypothesis at the .005 level of 
significance. A review of individual case results shows 
that subjects did not respond coherently to the individual 
decision problems. Furthermore, the difference in subject 
preferences between cases two and three lends support to 
prospect theory's contention that the framing of 
contingencies affects decision making. Subject responses to 
cases two and three provide evidence of inconsistent 
decision making behavior, a violation of rationality.
HYPOTHESIS 2
H2: subjects will not alter their decision preferences
between different frames of the same outcome of a 
resource allocation problem.
Like hypothesis one, the null form of hypothesis two is 
based on expected utility theory. The current study uses 
cases four and five to test this hypothesis. The four
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alternatives available in cases four and five all have 
identical expected values. Therefore, subjects should 
perceive no difference between the options of the individual 
cases. Furthermore, subjects should respond similarly in 
their decision preferences between cases.
Prospect theory offers an alternative hypothesis. 
According to prospect theory, decision preferences will 
change among alternatives as a result of changing the 
reference point regarding the outcome present in a decision 
problem. The theory predicts risk seeking preferences in 
situations framed as a loss and risk averse preferences in 
situations framed as a gain. In contrast to expected 
utility theory, therefore, there should be a significant 
difference between case four's preferred alternative and 
case 5's preferred alternative.
Case 4. As just mentioned, the expected utilities of 
the two alternatives of case four are objectively identical. 
However, the first alternative is presented as a guaranteed 
saving of jobs whereas the second alternative is presented 
as a probable saving of jobs. If subjects are "rational" 
decision makers as described by expected utility theory, 
they should be indifferent between the two alternatives. If 
subjects behave as predicted by prospect theory they should 
be risk averse and prefer the certainty of the first 
alternative over the probability of the second. Table 4.8 
shows that subjects did have a significant preference
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 1 9
between alternatives. Subjects of the current study 
violated expected utility theory and supported prospect
TABLE 4.8
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CASES FOUR AND FIVE 
BASED ON CHI-SQUARE
Comparison to Expected Utility Theory
Test Significance
Case Statistic Level
4 48.02 .005
5 .19 **
Comparison Between Current Study Cases 
Test Significance
Cases Statistic Level
4-5 12.16 .005
Comparison of Current Study to Prior Research—
Test Significance
Case Statistic Level
4 3.55 .100
5 69.38 .005
*Tversky & Kahneman [K&T, 1979 & T&K, 1981] 
results represent the expected frequencies for 
comparison to those observed in current study.
** Not significant.
theory by showing a preference for the "certain" alternative 
rather than indifference between the two alternatives.
Rather than 50% of the subjects preferring one of the two 
alternatives and the remaining 50% preferring the other, 79% 
of the subjects of the current study preferred the 
alternative framed as a guarantee of saving jobs, which is 
evidence of risk averse behavior in a gain-frame scenario.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
120
This deviation from expected utility theory is significant 
at the 0.005 level.
Case 5. Case five presents information objectively 
identical to the information in case four. However, the 
first alternative is presented as a guaranteed loss of jobs 
whereas the second alternative is presented as a probable 
loss of jobs. That is, the decision alternatives are framed 
as losses, rather than gains (as in case 4). If subj ects 
are "rational" decision makers as described by expected 
utility theory, they should be indifferent between the two 
alternatives. If subjects behave as predicted by prospect 
theory, they should be risk seeking and prefer the probable 
loss of the second alternative over the certain loss of the 
first.
Fifty-two percent of the subjects in the current study 
preferred the certain loss of the first alternative, and 
forty-eight percent of the subjects preferred the probable 
loss of jobs offered by the second alternative. Although 
there is a significant difference between cases four and 
five, these percentages are not entirely in agreement with 
the results suggested by prospect theory. Rather they tend 
to agree with results dictated by expected utility theory 
(see Table 4.8). One possible explanation for the 
significant difference between subject response to case five 
and Tversky and Kahneman's prior research results is the 
emotional impact of the issue presented. The subjects in
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that prior research were faced with loss of human lives and 
were more risk seeking (perhaps optimistic for the loss of 
no lives). Subjects in the current study seemed to accept 
the loss of some jobs and chose to minimize potential loss 
of jobs rather than gamble on losing all jobs.
Hypothesis 2 Summary. In summary, case five, viewed 
alone, cannot refute expected utility theory and hypothesis 
two. However, case four provides evidence of incoherent 
decision making behavior. While the results of the two 
cases discussed above are interesting in and of themselves, 
hypothesis two is tested best by comparing the Subjects' 
preferences for the alternatives of the two cases. When 
objectively identical information was presented in a gain 
frame as in case 4, 79% of the subjects preferred the 
alternative offering certainty. When the information was 
presented in a loss frame as in case 5, only 52% of the 
subjects preferred the alternative offering certainty. The 
direction of this shift in risk preference is consistent 
with prospect theory. As shown in Table 4.8, the preference 
difference is significant. Thus, there is evidence of 
preference reversal among alternatives of objectively 
identical problems framed differently, and hypothesis two is 
rejected. Moreover, this is additional evidence of 
inconsistent (i.e., irrational) decision making behavior.
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HYPOTHESIS 3
H3: subjects will choose the alternative which
maximizes expected utility.
Expected utility theory requires that rational decision 
makers choose the alternative of higher expected value and 
be indifferent between alternatives of equal expected value. 
By reviewing cases one through five, it is evident that 
subjects of the current study violated expected utility 
theory by choosing alternatives with lower expected values 
(as discussed above) and by changing preference between 
alternatives of equal expected value framed as gains rather 
than losses. Thus, hypothesis three is rejected, and 
subjects of the current study cannot be viewed as rational 
by the standards of expected utility theory.
SELECTION PROCEDURE AND THE HYPOTHESES
Governmental budgeting literature suggests that elected 
officials may behave differently from appointed officials.? 
Thus, a separate analysis of the behaviors of these two 
subject groups seemed warranted. Survey results were 
analyzed to determine whether elected subjects responded in 
any significantly different ways than appointed subjects 
responded.
Chi-square comparisons of the response frequencies of 
subjects who indicated they were elected to those of 
subjects who indicated they were appointed to their current
?See Cornia and Usher [1981], for example.
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governmental positions show significant differences for two 
of the five cases. With regard to case two, both subject 
groups exhibited preferences consistent with the preferences 
described by prospect theory. However, the appointed 
sub]ects exhibited stronger preferences in that direction 
(70% of the elected and 81% of the appointed chose the lower 
expected value alternative).®
With regard to case three, the two subject groups 
exhibited preferences in opposite directions from one 
another. Based on expected utility theory, elected subjects 
behaved more irrationally than appointed subjects by 
preferring the alternative of lower expected value (75% 
chose $37,500). Appointed subjects behaved more in 
accordance with expected utility theory inasmuch as 
significantly less of the appointed subjects preferred the 
alternative of lower expected value (45% chose $37,500). 
However, appointed subjects (like elected subjects) behaved 
incoherently by not exhibiting a significant preference for 
the alternative of higher expected value.
Personal Interviews 
The three research hypotheses tested by the survey are 
based on contentions of the well accepted expected utility 
theory with regard to decision making under uncertainty.
®Appointee responses were significantly stronger than 
the overall subject group responses at the 0.10 significance 
level.
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However, the survey cases were designed to test for 
violations of expected utility theory as described in 
prospect theory literature. As a means of assessing the 
applicability of the type (form) of decision problems 
incorporated in the survey's test cases, personal interviews 
of small government officials within the Baton Rouge area 
were conducted. The primary focus of the interviews, 
regarding prospect theory, was on the theory's explanations 
for inconsistent responses in terms of risk averse and risk 
seeking tendencies of individuals perceiving situations from 
different points of reference. An objective of the 
interviews was to determine whether or not local 
governmental unit budgeting personnel (or officials) 
perceive part of their job to include decision making under 
uncertainty. Assuming that decision making under 
uncertainty is perceived to be a part of the budget process, 
an additional objective of the interviews was to assess the 
evaluation of gains and losses in allocating resources 
throughout the governmental unit.® The interview format and 
examples of the responses follow the description of the 
interviewees (participants) below.
Twelve individuals agreed to participate in the 
interviewing process. All of the participants are
®Prospect theory predicts risk averse behavior when 
individuals are confronted with an evaluation of gains and 
risk seeking behavior when individuals are confronted with 
an evaluation of losses.
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associated with small local governments, which serve 
populations of less than 10,000 people, surrounding the 
Louisiana State University (LSU) area. The smallest and 
largest governmental units represented by the participants 
serve populations of 800 and 8000, respectively. All of the 
participants have budget preparation responsibilities within 
their governmental unit, and most had over five years of 
experience. The official titles of individuals interviewed 
varied, but included the titles of clerk, financial 
director, treasurer, manager, and mayor. Regardless of 
title, each interviewee indicated that the legislative 
council seeks the interviewee's input in the budgeting 
process.
Format. In an effort to maintain some uniformity 
across the individual interviews, each interview began by 
following a standard format. First, the interviewer 
introduced herself as an accounting doctoral student at LSU, 
and identified her dissertation interests to be in the 
budgeting process and decision making needs of small 
governmental units. Then, the interviewer explained the 
objective of the interview to be obtaining insight into the 
actual budgeting environment faced by individuals 
responsible for budget preparation in small governmental 
units. Participants were told that they were helping the 
interviewer design a meaningful survey, providing 
information not currently available in the literature, and
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helping to increase the quality of research focusing on 
small governmental units. Once participants were informed 
of their role, they were asked to respond to each of three 
questions :
1. What are some of the major constraints faced in 
serving the public?;
2. Can you recall a resource allocation decision 
having to be made between alternatives with expected 
positive outcomes but some degree of uncertainty 
regarding those outcomes?; and
3. Can you recall a resource allocation decision 
having to be made between alternatives with expected 
negative outcomes but some degree of uncertainty 
regarding those outcomes?
To aid in answering the last two questions, the interviewer
provided two examples of each type (i.e., positive and
negative) of decision. Responses to the three questions as
well as general input from the participants are discussed
below.
Interviewee Input. None of the interviewees hesitated 
in responding to the first question. All of them stated 
that there is a great deal of time pressure associated with 
the budgeting process. In order to meet the budgeting 
schedule, most participants expressed feeling time pressure 
in gathering information. In addition, each of the 
interviewees identified money to be a major budgeting 
constraint, and all made similar comments about there never 
being enough money to satisfy all of their constituents. 
Each interviewee mentioned that cuts in state and federal 
funding have had a significant impact on the budgeting
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process. Their governmental units have recently been forced 
to cut back in providing services or raise tax revenues. 
Suprisingly, one community recently passed a $0,005 sales 
tax with a 93% yes vote of the public. The interviewee 
associated with that community claims the sales tax success 
to be a result of "informing the people."
The second and third questions asked of the 
participants were asked together, and examples of each were 
provided to help trigger memories of similar situations 
participants had experienced in their current positions (see 
appendix B for the examples used during the interview 
process). Because the questions are identical, except for 
the gain or loss perspectives, responses to these questions 
are discussed simultaneously.
With the limited time alloted to the interview, most 
interviewees could only address one of the two questions, or 
an unresolved issue which ultimately may be perceived as 
either negative or positive. The participants had a 
tendency to recall a single situation of uncertainty and 
devote the entire interview to that issue.
One example of responses to the last two questions is 
the description of one governmental unit's laying off of 
one-fourth of their existing firemen. The interviewee 
explained the issue in terms of saving the taxpayers money. 
As long as the proposed volunteer firemen program could 
provide adequate coverage to replace the laid off firemen.
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the government's fire ratings were not expected to change 
except, perhaps, positively. That meant the government 
could save approximately $200,000 per year of the taxpayers' 
money because there would be a lower total salary figure for 
the fire department without an increased amount of fire 
insurance required for the government. Alternatively, the 
program could have been viewed as costing the government.
The government could have perceived a sure cost of $200,000 
per year in firemen salaries by retaining the firemen. The 
alternative could have been perceived as a probability of 
lower costs which might result by successfully replacing 
one-fourth of their firemen with volunteers, and a 
probability for higher costs if the volunteer program is 
unsuccessful, insurance costs increase and the firemen must 
be replaced.
When asked about the alternative view, the participant 
stressed that the government was sure the volunteer program 
would work and that it was highly likely that their fire 
rating would improve and there would be no increase in 
insurance costs to be born by the taxpayers. After a number 
of interviews, a pattern seemed apparent. It seemed that 
interviewees always presented and discussed situations in 
gain frame and near or absolute certainty terms when they 
were recalling a situation where the decision had already 
been made and the governmental unit was committed to that 
decision. This is an area for future research. However,
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for purposes of this study it must be noted that 
interviewees describing budgeting decision making situations 
of apparent uncertainty (as to outcome) could not express 
degrees of uncertainty or probabilities of alternative 
outcomes. They supported their decision as positive and 
most certain.
Two recurring issues among interviewees were 
electricity and water treatment (and sewer). None of the 
interviewees who discussed these topics had made any 
decision as of the interview date, but were in the process 
of weighing alternatives. Discussions of two of the 
participants are summarized below.
The electricity issue was one of the decision problem 
situations that a number of the participants were in the 
process of solving. To summarize the issues, the 
governmental units were weighing the following alternatives: 
(1) contract for electrical service with private companies, 
or (2) become a member of (or maintain membership in) a 
utility co-op. The private companies were offering 
competitive rates, but no long-term guarantees. The co-op 
offers competitive rates and gives member units some control 
through member representation on the co-op board of 
directors. Most participants describing this issue and its 
alternatives saw all options to be relatively equivalent in
l^These discussions are fairly representative of the 
interviewees who discussed these issues.
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the short-run. However, when considering the long-run, the 
co-op alternative was described as guaranteeing reasonable 
rates into the future. The private companies were described 
as being more uncertain. There was a probability that the 
private companies could provide the additional savings they 
alluded to in negotiations, but there was also a probability 
that the private companies would increase their rates and 
provide no additional savings (or perhaps no savings at all) 
beyond those of the co-op. Participants indicated that they 
had sought expert advise regarding the options; however, 
they did not trust that advise beyond a five year horizon.
Although the legislative councils of the governmental 
units involved had not voted on the issue, the participants 
expressed their opinions on the alternatives. In every 
instance, the participant felt the co-op would provide the 
highest degree of certainty as a result of the 
representation on the board, and preferred that alternative. 
Even though there was a probability that the private 
companies could offer substantial additional savings in the 
long-run, the participants also perceived a high probability 
of no such savings.
The second unresolved issue discussed by many of the 
participants was the issue of water and sewer treatment. An 
example of the decision problem is the situation described 
below, which is currently being addressed by one of the 
interviewees. The example government is relying on the
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expert opinion of an engineering firm in the weighing of 
alternatives.
The decision problem to be solved is the satisfaction 
of Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) requirements 
regarding the government's current sewer system. The 
governmental unit perceives no choice as to whether or not 
to improve the system because the penalties associated with 
noncompliance are sufficiently high to prohibit 
noncompliance. Thus, the decision problem is how to improve 
the system. Four courses of action (alternatives) are being 
considered. The first alternative is to upgrade the
existing system, which would guarantee satisfaction of the
(
existing requirements. However, this alternative would not 
satisfy more stringent requirements proposed by the state. 
The second alternative would be an upgrade like the first 
alternative, but would include additional filters. This has 
a high probability of consistently meeting the state's more 
stringent proposed requirements. The third alternative 
would abandon the existing system for a new plant, which 
guarantees to meet the proposed more stringent requirements. 
The fourth alternative also abandons the existing system and 
requires the construction of a plant on or near the river, 
where the E.P.A. and state apply less stringent 
requirements. The costs per alternative increase from 
$450,000 for alternative one to $1.2 million for alternative 
four.
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The governmental unit was not focusing on the immediate 
costs of the alternatives. Rather it was concerned with 
meeting E.P.A. standards for the longest period of time.
The engineering firm emphasized that requirements for 
systems other than those discharging into the river have 
become more stringent over time. Moreover, the experts 
suggest that the probability is high that the trend for 
increasing stringency will continue. Thus, it is expected 
that the preferred alternative will be alternative four, 
which provides the highest probability of satisfying all 
requirements into the future. All of the alternatives would 
satisfy current requirements. Alternatives three and four 
would satisfy the proposed requirements. However, only 
alternative four offers some assurance of satisfying future 
requirement levels.
Summary of Insights. Although the interview process 
was limited to interviews of small governmental unit 
officials (personnel) within one specific area of the United 
States, the process served to provide additional insight 
(beyond that obtained by the mail survey) regarding the 
resource allocation decision making environment of small 
governments. Each of the interviewees confirmed the idea 
that time pressure and limited funds make budgeting a 
challenge. Even though expert advise regarding specific 
decision problems is often available, many of the 
participants indicated that their government often does not
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have the time or money to seek the advise. Participants who 
indicated that their government had contracted for expert 
advise also suggested that they tended to alter the 
probabilities experts express regarding alternative courses 
of action for a decision problem.
The interviews also confirmed the idea that the 
constituency of small local governments seem to be more 
aware of (concerned with) the actions of their governments. 
With regard to the actions of the governmental units, the 
interviews assessed the applicability of case decision 
problems (similar to those used on the mail survey) within 
the resource allocation process. The interviewees expressed 
no trouble relating to the example cases used to start the 
discussion of uncertainty in budgeting (see appendix B). 
However, most participants experienced difficulty in 
recalling the perceived probabilities of alternatives 
associated with decisions that already had been made. In 
discussions of uncertain outcomes, participants attached 
certainty (or near certainty) to the alternative course of 
action chosen, and presented the issue in a gain frame. The 
selection of the certain gain is in accordance with prospect 
theory; however, the fact that the decision had already been 
made and the government was committed to a particular course 
of action seemed to affect the presentation of the issue. 
This is an area for future research.
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The interviews of participants who were in the process 
of evaluating alternatives of a decision problem also 
suggested a tendency to employ a gain frame in their 
presentation of the alternatives. Again, the participants 
evaluating the alternatives from a gain reference point 
indicated preferences for the most certain outcome 
alternative (even when the expected value of costs was 
higher). One interesting observation was that participants 
used a gain frame almost exclusively. An interesting follow 
up study would be to determine which alternative was 
ultimately selected, how that selection is rationalized by 
the governmental unit, and how the other alternatives are 
perceived once the choice has been made.
Summary
This chapter presented the results and analysis of the 
mail survey used to investigate local governmental decision 
making behavior in situations of uncertainty. In addition, 
the chapter presented a summary of personal interview 
findings with regard to the budgeting environment of small 
local governments and their resource allocation decision 
problems- As suggested in previous chapters, prospect 
theory rather than the well accepted expected utility theory 
was found to be more descriptive of respondents' behavior in 
decision situations of uncertainty.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
The purposes of this chapter are to (1) provide a brief 
summary of the research study which was undertaken, (2) 
discuss the implications of the results of the study in the 
context of the current body of literature in the areas of 
small local government resource allocation and decision 
making under uncertainty, (3) discuss the limitations of the 
study, and (4) discuss the implications of this study for 
future research.
Summary of Studv 
A behavioral study was conducted to examine the 
decision making behavior of individuals responsible for 
resource allocation (budget preparation) within small local 
governmental units. Six hundred governmental units, serving 
no more than 10,000 people each, were randomly selected from 
the 1987 directory of United States government names and 
addresses, which is published by the Census Bureau. 
Approximately 47% of these governments returned usable 
replies. The budget preparer of each government received a 
survey consisting of two short cases. Each case was 
designed to represent a resource allocation decision making 
problem under conditions of uncertainty. O ' ,  1 t h e  cases
focused on employee lay offs. Each subject received this 
case in the form of either a gain or a loss frame. The 
other case focused on federal funding for capital
135
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improvements. Each subject received one of three possible 
federal funding cases. All three of the cases were 
presented in a gain frame, and were designed to detect the 
certainty and pseudocertainty effects. All five cases used 
in the study were designed to detect risk averse and risk 
seeking tendencies within the population of small local 
government resource allocators.
Two independent variables were used in the experimental 
design. The first independent variable was the frame of the 
decision problem outcome. Half of the subjects received the 
employee lay off decision problem with the two alternative 
courses of action framed as gains. The other half received 
the same decision problem with the two alternatives framed 
as losses. The second independent variable was the frame of 
the decision problem contingency. One-third of the subjects 
received the federal funding decision problem framed as a 
one-stage decision problem with one certain alternative and 
one probable alternative of higher expected value. A second 
one-third of the subjects received the federal funding 
decision problem framed as a two-stage decision problem, 
where the chance of reaching the second stage was 25% and 
there is no pay off unless the second stage is reached.
Once at the second stage, the decision problem presents one 
certain alternative and one probable alternative of higher 
expected value. The remaining one-third of the subjects 
received the two-stage federal funding decision problem in
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preintegrated form. That is, the 25% chance of reaching the 
second stage was incorporated into the alternatives so that 
the subjects' decision was made between two probable 
payoffs. The experimental design described above is 
illustrated in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1
SUMMARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL TREATMENTS 
INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Frame of Federal Funding Contingency
Frame of 
Employee 
Lav offs
One-stage
certainty
alternative
Two-stage
certainty
alternative
One-stage
probable
alternatives
Gain
Outcome A B C
Loss
Outcome D E F
The research question examined in the course of the 
study was concerned with the effect of presentation (or 
framing) of decision problem alternatives on the rational 
choice behavior of budget preparers representing small local 
governmental units. Three statistically testable hypotheses 
were formulated to address the research question. The 
hypotheses (expressed in their null forms) were as follows:
HI: The budget manager will not alter his decision
preferences between different frames of the same 
contingency.
H2: The budget manager will not alter his decision
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preferences between different frames of the same 
outcome.
H3 : The budget manager will choose the alternative 
which maximizes expected utility.
Hypothesis one was rejected by the data. The results 
for each of the three cases indicate incoherent decision 
behavior. In addition, a comparison of responses to cases 
two and three indicates inconsistent decision behavior. The 
results support prospect theory's contention that decision 
makers react differently to information presented in 
preintegrated form than they do to the same information 
presented in non-pre integrated form, where one of the 
decision alternatives may be perceived as being certain. 
Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the three cases used to 
test hypothesis one.
Hypothesis two was rejected by a comparison of 
responses to two objectively identical cases framed 
differently as to outcomes. As Table 4.8 shows, subjects 
exhibited a significant preference for the alternative 
offering certainty when the decision problem and 
alternatives were presented in a gain frame (case 4) rather 
than in a loss frame (case 5). When the alternatives were 
framed as losses, the preference for the certain alternative 
was significantly diluted. Because each alternative of the 
two cases (that is, each of the four alternatives) was 
objectively identical, subjects' preference for one 
alternative over the other was incoherent behavior and in
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violation of expected utility theory. Moreover, the shift 
in risk preference between case four and case five is 
evidence of inconsistent decision making behavior, which is 
also considered a violation of expected utility theory.
Hypothesis three was also rejected. Table 5.2 
summarizes the subjects' preferences by case in terms of the 
expected value of the case alternatives. Subjects not only 
preferred alternatives of lower expected value, but also 
changed preferences (i.e., were not indifferent) between 
alternatives of equal expected value framed as gains rather 
than losses. These results are in violation of expected 
utility theory and its definition of rational decision 
behavior under conditions of uncertainty.
TABLE 5.2
CASE RESULTS OF CURRENT STUDY IN TERMS OF 
CASE ALTERNATIVE EXPECTED VALUE
Alternative
Expected
Value
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Higher 13% 24% 43% n/a n/a
Lower 87% 76% 57% n/a n/a
Equal n/a n/a n/a _
79% 52%
21% 48%
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
140
Implications of the Results of the Study
Previous research in two primary areas served as a 
basis for the study. Of general interest was work 
addressing characteristics of local governmental units. 
However, work of primary interest to the study was that 
focusing on the budgeting environment of local governmental 
units, especially the early decision making stage of the 
resource allocation process. Empirical research in both of 
these areas was sparse, with most findings based on case 
studies of single governmental units or small groups of 
units. Budgeting studies have tended to emphasize the 
results of the budgeting process, while tending to ignore 
the decision making process. The call for research into the 
decision making process of local governmental units had been 
made and acknowledged. Yet, the call had not been answered 
by empirical work with small governments prior to this 
study.
Although researchers have paid minimal attention to 
small local governments or the resource allocation 
activities of local governments, previous research did 
provide a basis for this study. The current study can be 
linked to previous research in several ways. As discussed 
in chapter two, earlier research noted (1) the important 
role of local governments as the primary provider of 
domestic services; (2) the constraints on small local 
governments imposed by limited resources; (3) local
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government budgeters' focus on risk and their reliance on 
nonquant itat ive risk analysis procedures; and (4) an 
increasingly critical citizenry monitoring local governments 
more closely. The first and last issues were not 
questioned, but considered givens for the current research. 
Those issues provided a very basic impetus for the focus on 
small local governments. The second and third issues were 
addressed, to some extent, by the survey and the interview 
process of this study.
The interviews with small local government budgeting 
personnel support the findings of prior case studies 
regarding limited resources (both human and monetary). All 
interviewees suggested that there is never enough money to 
satisfy everyone in the community. They expressed a sense 
of pressure associated with the allocation of limited 
monetary resources to seemingly endless requests. Previous 
findings with regard to human constraints (or limited human 
resources) can be tied into the issue of allocating limited 
monetary resources among the constituency. Although small 
local governments have a legislative council which approves 
the budget, a single budget preparer often dominates the 
entire budget process.1 The current study supports the 
contentions of prior research that professional budget 
officers are rare among small local governments. Only 19% 
of the governmental units of this study employed a full-time
^See Sokolow and Honadle [1984] and Cothran [1986].
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budget officer. As suggested in the literature, 44% of the 
budget preparers responding to the current study were clerks 
and the majority of those clerks (52%) were elected.
Selection method (elected or appointed) had been 
suggested to be a potential cause of different decision 
making behavior within the population of local government 
resource allocators. This study has provided some empirical 
support for the contention that differences exist in 
decision making behavior of elected versus appointed budget 
preparers. Table 4.4 shows that only 42% of the budget 
preparers responding to this study were elected to their 
positions.
By comparing the case alternative preferences of 
elected and appointed budget preparers, this study detected 
only two differences in decision making behavior between the 
two groups. First, appointed preparers exhibited a stronger 
preference for the alternative associated with pseudo­
certainty in the two-stage federal funding decision problem 
(case two). However, both groups preferred that same 
alternative, which was associated with the lower expected 
value.2 Second, given two probable alternatives (e.g., the 
preintegrated form of the federal funding problem as 
presented in case three), significantly more of the 
appointed preparers chose the alternative of higher risk and
^Appointee responses were significantly stronger than 
the overall subject group responses at the 0.1 significance 
level.
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higher expected value. However, according to expected 
utility theory, both groups of preparers exhibited 
irrational decision behavior by preferring the alternatives 
of lower expected value.
This behavior lends support to the contentions of 
prospect theory. That is, this study suggests that the 
decision behavior of both elected and appointed resource 
allocators of small local governments supports prospect 
theory literature. As expected, the preferred decision 
alternative for the survey decision problems framed as gains 
was the alternative of perceived certainty. Insight 
obtained from the personal interviews is used below to 
expand on this finding with regard to small local government 
budget preparer decision behavior.
Budget preparers interviewed during this study 
presented decision problems in a gain frame, and supported 
the alternative expressed as certainty with regard to the 
perceived critical aspect of the decision problem. Of the 
twelve subjects participating in the interviews, none of 
them could recall a decision problem (within the limited 
time of the interview) in a negative (or loss) frame. It is 
possible that previous research findings together with this 
study's interviews provide an explanation for the surveyed 
subjects' somewhat unexpected rational behavior in response 
to the single decision problem (case five) presented in a
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loss frame.3 It appears that small government resource 
allocators operate in an environment where it is more 
comfortable to structure resource allocation decision 
problems in terms of gains.
When facing a choice between a sure gain and a 
potentially higher gain, political and social pressures 
might deter resource allocators from passing up a sure gain. 
They may anticipate difficulty in justifying their decision 
should the higher (yet riskier) gain never reach fruition. 
When perceiving a choice between a sure loss and a 
potentially higher loss, surveyed resource allocators 
exhibited behavior that was in more accordance with expected 
utility theory. However, only one survey case presented a 
decision problem in a loss frame.
This study has provided an empirical foundation for 
future research. Insights from the interviews indicate that 
small local government officials do face decision problems 
accompanied by uncertain outcomes when addressing the 
budgeting of scarce resources. The results of the random 
sampling of small local governments surveyed demonstrates 
that these decision makers cannot be assumed to react 
rationally (in terms of expected utility theory) to decision
^Unlike the results of case four (gain frame), the 
results of case five (loss frame) indicate that subjects 
were indifferent between the two objectively identical 
alternatives (52% preferred the certain alternative and 483 
preferred the risky alternative). See Bazerman [1984] and 
Puto [1985] for a discussion of subjects framing actual 
decision problems faced within their environment.
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problems under conditions of uncertainty. The reaction of 
these small governments' budgeting personnel to varied 
frames (or presentations) of objectively identical 
information could be explained in terms of prospect theory. 
This issue of "rational" decision making within the resource 
allocation process served as the motivation for the current 
study. These findings provide the foundation for extended 
research on the budgeting systems of small local 
governments, and a few of those extensions are briefly 
described in the last section of this chapter.
Limitations of the Studv
As previously indicated, this study was the first one 
to address the early stage of decision making in the 
resource allocation process of budgeting within small local 
governmental units. The study's findings should be 
generalizable as a result of using actual budgeting 
personnel, those with the responsibility of identifying and 
compiling information for the budgeting process. However, 
the limitations of any behavioral experiment threaten this 
study's validity.
Readers should note that this study and its findings 
are based on responses to structured cases, which may not be 
representative of the subject's actual decision making 
environment. Further research is necessary to determine 
whether similar results can be associated with subjects 
operating within their natural budgetary decision making
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environment in the absence of such structured cases. Hypo­
thetical decision problems were abstracted from their 
realistic environment in an attempt to reduce experimental 
noise. As a result of this abstraction, experimentally 
manipulated differences are likely to stand out more 
noticeably within the decision problem than they would in a 
real setting. Therefore, this study's results may not be 
found in a more realistic setting. Alternatively, failure 
to control experimental noise is likely to produce at least 
equally misleading conclusions resulting from camouflaging 
and biasing effects of the noise.
It was reassuring (to some extent) to find situations
of uncertainty existing in the interviewed subjects' 
resource allocation environment. Although interviewed 
subj ects typically did not perceive dichotomous alternatives
(as provided by the survey decision problems), they did
perceive a limited number of alternatives. Moreover, they 
relied on their own assessment or that of an expert to 
assign some degree of risk (or certainty) to each 
alternative (regarding the critical aspect of the decision 
problem).
The abstraction of decision problems necessary to 
survey the 600 unique small local governmental units 
comprising the random sample are associated with another 
potential limitation. Subjects were asked to role play when 
scenarios (employment or federal funding levels) were not
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representative of the subject's environment. To the extent 
that subjects required to role play could not project 
themselves into the scenario, the meaningfulness of the 
study's results may be questioned.*
While considering the subjects' reaction to abstract 
decision problems and their legitimate response to the 
cases, it is interesting to note that at least one subject 
indicated that he consciously considered the payoffs and 
perceived risks associated with each alternative (the 
amounts and probabilities were underscored by the subject). 
This subject reacted in accordance with prospect theory. 
This provides some assurance that the behavior of subjects, 
in gereral, was not caused by an inability to deal with the 
abstract nature of the cases or a refusal to consider the 
salient points presented.
The third limitation results from using a mail survey 
to collect data from the population of small governmental 
units. Although the sample was random and survey versions 
(manipulations) were randomly assigned, the sample's 
response rate was less than 100% and the sample size varied 
among survey versions. The study's response rate was
 ^The average number of employees for surveyed subjects 
was 27. The case scenario based on employee lay offs 
identified 60 jobs at risk with 20 guaranteed to be saved 
(40 lost) or chances of saving (losing) all or none of the 
60 jobs. Average levels of 1987 federal funding was 
$432,807. The federal funding case scenario used 
alternatives of perceived certainty and risk associated with 
payoffs of $150,000 and $200,000. See Table 4.1 for 
summarized case scenarios.
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approximately 50%. Therefore, the findings of the study 
should not be generalized to the population of small local 
governmental units' budgeting officials without noting that 
approximately half of the budgeting officials sampled did 
not respond. There is no reason to expect the 
nonrespondents to differ significantly from the respondents. 
A chi-square test indicated no significant differences 
between results of the first mailing and results of the 
second mailing. However, the potential for nonresponse- bias 
does exist.
As discussed earlier, the study used five cases to 
address the research question. Only one of those cases was 
framed from a loss (or negative) perspective. Cases one 
through three were alternative framings of contingencies, 
and were each presented in a gain scenario. It should be 
noted that the results may be different when subjects are 
presented with framing of contingency problems in a loss 
context. While response to the single loss-frame case (case 
five) contributed to findings of inconsistent decision 
preference with regard to risk, responses were not entirely 
consistent with prospect theory. While there was a 
significant shift in the direction predicted by prospect 
theory, subjects did not exhibit risk seeking tendencies 
when faced with that loss frame decision problem. 
Furthermore, interviewed subjects did not readily recall or
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discuss negative decision scenarios from their governmental 
experience.
Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations discussed above suggest several 
extensions to this study that might be undertaken. The 
current study did not employ a loss scenario in the framing 
of contingencies. One extension of this study should 
incorporate a loss scenario into the research design so that 
small government budgeting officials' decision behavior can 
be analyzed and compared to the gain scenario decision 
behavior of this study. Results of the survey, as well as 
the interviews, suggest a need for further investigation of 
the subjects' apparent fixation on gain frames.
The reliance on abstract cases which present specific 
payoffs and probabilities of payoffs was also mentioned in 
the limitations to this study. Another extension of the 
study might focus on this issue by varying payoffs and 
probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky [1979] suggest the need 
for such an extension in their discussion of decision 
makers' threshold sensitivity levels with regard to payoffs 
and probabilities. For example, decision makers may react 
more strongly to a one percent change in probability when 
the change is from one to zero percent than when the change 
is from two to one percent.
The study surveyed budget preparers, or individuals 
responsible for the compilation and presentation of
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information ultimately to be included in the budget 
deliberations with the local government's legislative 
council. Future research could include a replication of 
this study employing as subjects members of the small local 
government's legislative council. Such a study could 
provide insight into the effects of presentation framing on 
the budget deliberations of the council and the budgeting 
officials. Public administration literature suggests that 
presentation leads to deliberations and deliberations 
produce results.
Each of these extensions are seemingly worthy of future 
research effort; however, the following extension is 
considered the most direct extension of practical 
significance to the population of small local governments. 
This extension is into the area of budgeting system 
development. Kahneman and Tversky [1979] claim that 
departures from expected utility theory (with regard to 
preference) can be corrected by decision makers once they 
realize preferences are inconsistent, intransitive or 
inadmissable. Awareness of the impact of framing (as found 
in the current study) should be used to improve'resource 
allocation decisions.5
^Northcraft and Neale [1986] have done work in this 
area. Their work might prove helpful in future research 
devoted to the development of more comprehensive (perhaps 
frame neutral) budget planning systems.
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Budget preparers could be trained to detect framing 
differences and edit the decision problem in such a way that 
prevents framing from having a significant influence over 
resource allocation. Once such a training program has been 
developed and tested, its implementation could result in 
more efficient resource allocations and confidence among 
budget preparers. That is, budget preparers should be more 
confident that they are choosing among resource allocation 
alternatives based on objective differences of significance 
to the community, rather than on manipulated perspectives of 
the decision problem. For example, this study suggests that 
budget preparers of small local governments are more 
comfortable with gain scenarios than loss scenarios, and 
prefer certain gains over risky gains. An effective 
training program could emphasize this tendency among small 
government budget preparers and show how decision preference 
manipulation might occur as a result of the presenter's 
widening or narrowing the decision problem perspective to 
achieve the intended decision frame. The guidance in 
decision making under uncertainty which could be offered by 
a training program would help budget preparers defend their 
actions (decisions) to their constituents and ease some of 
the pressure currently associated with the decision making 
process of resource allocation in small local governments.
Improved decision making in the resource allocation 
process should have significant practical implications for
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individuals involved with the budgeting process of small 
local governments, including constituents as well as 
budgeting personnel. Constituents will likely continue to 
scrutinize the work of their governments and demand the most 
efficient and effective allocation of their resources.
Small local governments which are aware of the impact of 
framing would have the opportunity of assessing the 
rationality of their own behavior throughout the budgeting 
process. However, two points in time during the budgeting 
process might be most affected by an understanding of 
framing: (1) the initial assessment of the decision problem
and its alternatives, and (2) the justification of decision 
choice (or course of action) to the constituents.
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November 18, 1988 
'FI'
Dear 'F3':
Small local governmental units similar to yours represent a 
significant element in our U.S. governmental system. 
Surprisingly, smaller governmental units have not received 
the attention of researchers. I am attempting to lay a 
foundation for continuing research focusing on the needs of 
smaller governmental units across the United States.
Your governmental unit has been randomly selected to 
participate in my study. I need your response to make the 
results of my random sampling meaningful. I can assure you 
that all responses will be kept completely confidential. By 
taking approximately ten minutes to read the general 
instructions, below, and complete the enclosed survey, you 
will be making a significant contribution toward the 
successful completion of my degree. More importantly, you 
will be helping to expand the focus of governmental research 
to include the governmental units which most directly affect 
the daily lives of a substantial portion of U.S. citizens —  
small local governments.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. Please read the two short cases 
printed on the back of this letter. Each case should be 
considered separately. Please consider all decision factors 
not explicitly mentioned in the cases to be relatively equal 
among the alternatives. After reading each case, please 
indicate the course of action you prefer by checking the 
blank representing your choice on the accompanying response 
form. Also, make sure to complete the demographic questions 
presented in the first part of the response form. When 
complete, simply staple the form closed and drop it in the 
mail.
Sincere thanks.
Karen McKenzie 
Ph.D. Candidate, LSU
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December 7, 1988
"FI"
Dear "F3";
A few weeks ago, I sent you a questionnaire regarding your 
small local government. I feel small local governmental 
units similar to yours represent a significant element in 
our U.S. governmental system. Thus, my survey is attempting 
to lay a foundation for continuing research focusing on the 
needs of smaller governmental units across the United 
States. I have already received numerous completed 
questionnaires, and if yours was among them, I sincerely 
thank you. However, if you have not yet had a chance to 
answer the questionnaire, I am enclosing another one in the 
hope that you will now have a few minutes to do so.
I have asked a very few governmental units to help me with 
this project, so your individual response is extremely 
important —  in fact, without your help, my project cannot 
succeed. Again, I can assure you that all responses will be 
kept completely confidential.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. Please read the two short cases 
printed on the back of this letter. Each case should be 
considered separately. Please consider all decision factors 
not explicitly mentioned in the cases to be relatively equal 
among the alternatives. After reading each case, please 
indicate the course of action you prefer by checking the 
blank representing your choice on the accompanying response 
form. Also, make sure to complete the demographic questions 
presented in the first part of the response form. When 
complete, simply staple the form closed and drop it in the 
mail.
Sincere thanks.
Karen McKenzie 
Ph.D. Candidate, LSU
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The following cases have been designed to survey local 
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers 
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you 
project yourself into the case government to respond to the 
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for 
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top 
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE I
Research indicates a trend decreasing federal aid and an 
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your 
budget office projects a need to layoff 60 government 
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for 
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's 
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the 
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all employees 
from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of saving none of 
the employees from the layoff.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
CASE II
Without the expertise of a federal aid coordinator, you feel 
it is extremely unlikely that your government will secure 
any federal funding. Thus, your government has be^n 
negotiations to hire a federal aid coordinator to improve 
your chances of obtaining federal funding for capital 
improvements and special programs. You know that the 
applicants for the coordinator position are also negotiating 
with other governmental units, and you estimate that you
have a 25% chance of hiring one of the applicants. If you
hire one of the applicants you feel absolutely confident 
that the coordinator can secure $150,000 for capital 
improvements by focusing all energies on a specific 
strategy, and you arc 80% confident that the coordinator can 
secure $200,000 by pursuing an alternative strategy. 
Preliminary paperwork must be submitted for approval by the 
council before the hiring process is expected to be 
completed. Which one of the coordinator strategies would 
you choose to present to the council?
A: ($150,000) or B: ($200,000, .80)
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local 
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers 
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you 
project yourself into the case government to respond to the 
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for 
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top 
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE A
Without the expertise of a federal aid coordinator, you feel 
it is extremely unlikely that your government will secure 
any federal funding. Thus, your government has begun 
negotiations to hire a federal aid coordinator to improve 
your chances of obtaining federal funding for capital 
improvements and special programs. You know that the 
applicants for the coordinator position are also negotiating 
with other governmental units, and you estimate that you 
have a 25% chance of hiring one of the applicants. If you 
hire one of the applicants you feel absolutely confident 
that the coordinator can secure $150,000 for capital 
improvements by focusing all energies on a specific 
strategy, and you are 80% confident that the coordinator can 
secure $200,000 by pursuing an alternative strategy. 
Preliminary paperwork must be submitted for approval by the 
council before the hiring process is expected to be 
completed. Which one of the coordinator strategies would 
you choose to present to the council?
A: ($150,000) or B: ($200,000, .80)
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
CASE B
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an 
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your 
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government 
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for 
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's 
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40 
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government 
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability that 
60 government employee jobs will be lost.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local 
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers 
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you 
project yourself into the case government to respond to the 
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for 
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top 
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE 1
Your government's federal aid coordinator has two strategic 
options available for the current period's consideration. 
Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting in federal aid of 
$200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance of resulting in federal 
aid of $150,000. Which option would you encourage the 
coordinator to pursue:
Z: $200,000; .2 or Y: $150,000; .25
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
CASE 2
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an 
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your 
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government 
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for 
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's 
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the 
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all employees 
from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of saving none of 
the employees from the layoff.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local 
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people^ Therefore, you may find the numbers 
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you 
project yourself into the case government to respond to the 
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for 
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top 
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE X
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an 
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your 
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government 
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for 
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's 
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40 
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government 
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability that 
60 government employee jobs will be lost.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
CASE Y
Your government's federal aid coordinator has two strategic 
options available for the current period's consideration. 
Option Z has a 20% chance of resulting in federal aid of 
$200,000. Option Y has a 25% chance of resulting in federal 
aid of $150,000. Which option would you encourage the 
coordinator to pursue;
Z: $200,000; .2 or Y: $150,000; .25
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
167
The following cases have been designed to survey local 
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers 
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you 
project yourself into the case government to respond to the 
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for 
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top 
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE E
Research indicates a trend in decreasing federal aid and an 
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your 
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government 
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for 
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's 
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan A is guaranteed to save 20 employees from the 
layoff.
Plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving all employees 
from the layoff and a 2/3 probability of saving none of 
the employees from the layoff.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
CASE Z
Which of the following options do you prefer?
A. a sure receipt of $150,000 in federal funding for 
capital improvements
B. 80% chance of receiving $200,000 in federal 
funding for capital improvements
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
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The following cases have been designed to survey local 
governments serving from less than 100 to approximately
10,000 people. Therefore, you may find the numbers 
unrealistic for your government. It is important that you 
project yourself into the case government to respond to the 
two cases, and then provide the more realistic numbers for 
your governmental unit on the appropriate blanks in the top 
portion of the enclosed response form.
CASE (i)
Which of the following options do you prefer?
A. a sure receipt of $150,000 in federal funding for 
capital improvements
B. 80% chance of receiving $200,000 in federal 
funding for capital improvements
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
CASE (ii)
Research indicates a decreasing trend in federal aid and an 
increasing demand for total governmental expenditures. Your 
budget office projects the need to layoff 60 government 
employees. However, two plans to alleviate this need for 
layoffs were submitted along with the budget staff's 
projection. Which plan would you favor?
Plan C is guaranteed to result in a loss of 40 
government employee jobs.
Plan D has a 1/3 probability that no government 
employee jobs will be lost and a 2/3 probability that 
60 government employee jobs will be lost.
Please refer to the bottom of the accompanying response form 
and indicate your preference.
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Official title of respondent ___________________________.
Is this an ___ elected or ___ appointed position?
Educational Background.
Please indicate highest level of education completed:
 Level___________  Area of Studv___________
  High School  .
  Associates Degree _______________________________ .
  Bachelors Degree  .
  Masters Degree  .
Professional Experience.
Years in current position
Years of local government budgeting experience
Estimated population of your jurisdiction
Type of local government (check one):
  Municipality __ School district __  County
  Township __ Special district   Other _
Does your government have a full-time budget officer? __
Yes __ No.
If "yes,” is this an __ elected or __ appointed position?
Number of local government employees __________________ .
1987 federal funding received for capital improvements
5_____________
Please refer to the two independent case scenarios printed 
on the back of the letter accompanying this form. For each 
case, check the plan or option you prefer [Case, Plan and 
Option changed to match each of the six versions].
Response to Case I:   Plan A   Plan B.
Response to Case II: Option A   Option B.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
APPENDIX B 
EXAMPLE CASES FOR INTERVIEWS
170
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
171
EXAMPLE #1
ISSUE: PUBLIC SAFETY
LIMITED RESOURCES: CITY FUNDS
$ INVOLVED: COST OF ONE TRAFFIC LIGHT
PERCEIVED ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES: BASED ON A STUDY DONE BY
YOUR DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, WHICH ESTIMATED THE PROJECTED 
NUMBER OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS AT INTERSECTIONS THROUGHOUT THE 
CITY:
1. IF YOU HANG A TRAFFIC LIGHT AT THE INTERSECTION OF 
X & Y STREETS, VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE PROJECTED 50 MAJOR 
ACCIDENTS AT THAT INTERSECTION CAN BE AVOIDED;
2. IF YOU HANG A TRAFFIC LIGHT AT THE INTERSECTION OF 
E & Z STREETS, THERE IS A 1/3 CHANCE THAT THE 180 
PROJECTED MAJOR ACCIDENTS FOR THE INTERSECTION WILL BE 
AVOIDED AND A 2/3 CHANCE THAT NONE OF THE 180 MAJOR 
ACCIDENTS WILL BE AVOIDED
WHY VIEWED AS POSITIVE: SAFETY OR AVOIDING INJURY
PROBABILITIES : 1— 100% 2— 1/3 & 2/3
EXAMPLE #2
ISSUE : PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
LIMITED RESOURCE: CITY REVENUES
$ INVOLVED: COST OF OPERATING ALONG ROUTES
PERCEIVED ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES : DUE TO BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
THE CITY IS CONSIDERING CUTTING BACK ON THE NUMBER OF ROUTES 
NOW OFFERED BY THE CITY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. AFTER 
ESTIMATING FUTURE GROWTH ALONG THE ROUTES AND PROJECTING 
DEMAND FOR THE SYSTEM, YOU FEEL THE FOLLOWING ARE YOUR 
ALTERNATIVES :
1. IF YOU CUT ROUTE #5, YOU FEEL CERTAIN THAT 10% OF 
YOUR PATRONS WILL BE WITHOUT A NEEDED SERVICE;
2. IF YOU CUT ROUTE #3, YOU FEEL THERE IS A 1/3 CHANCE 
THAT 36% OF YOUR PATRONS WILL BE WITHOUT SERVICE AND 
THERE IS A 2/3 CHANCE THAT NO PATRONS WILL BE WITHOUT A 
NEEDED SERVICE.
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WHY VIEWED AS NEGATIVE: REDUCTION OF SERVICE 
PROBABILITIES: 1— 100% 2— 1/3 & 2/3
EXAMPLE #3
ISSUE: PRIVATIZATION OF TRASH COLLECTION
LIMITED RESOURCE: CITY FUNDS
$ INVOLVED: CONTRACT PRICE (VERY CLOSE BETWEEN BIDDERS)
PERCEIVED OUTCOMES: AFTER A REVIEW OF THE BID PROPOSALS AND
PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH BIDDERS, THERE IS SOME CHANCE 
THAT CONTRACTORS CAN PROVIDE CUSTOMERS SOME SAVINGS OF 
CURRENT COLLECTION CHARGES. THE TWO ALTERNATIVES ARE:
1. CONTRACTOR #1 GUARANTEES A 5% SAVINGS IN ANNUAL 
COLLECTION CHARGES.
2. CONTRACTOR #2 IS 20% CONFIDENT IT CAN PROVIDE 30% 
SAVINGS AND 80% CONFIDENT IT CAN PROVIDE NO SAVINGS.
WHY PERCEIVED POSITIVE: POTENTIAL CUSTOMER SAVINGS.
PROBABILITIES: 1— 100% 2— 20% & 80%
EXAMPLE #4 
ISSUE: ATTRACTING INDUSTRY TO THE AREA
LIMITED RESOURCE: CITY LAND
$ INVOLVED: VALUE OF LAND
PERCEIVED ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES:
1. IF CO. A BUILDS A PLANT ON THE DONATED LAND, IT 
GUARANTEES 30 JOBS WILL BE AVAILABLE;
2. IF CO. B BUILDS A PLANT ON THE DONATED LAND, IT IS 
20% CERTAIN NO JOBS WILL BE AVAILABLE AND IT IS 80% 
CERTAIN THAT 40 JOBS WILL BE AVAILABLE
WHY PERCEIVED POSITIVE: CREATING JOBS
PROBABILITIES : 1— 100% 2— 20% & 80%
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